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"[Itis easierfor heaven and earth to pass away, thanfor one stroke of a
letter in the law to be dropped." Luke 16.17 (ARSM0

I. Introduction
The inherent agency doctrine is one means by which a third party may
subject principals to liability for their agents' conduct. The American Law
Institute is drafting a new Restatement of Agency, and that draft has
eliminated inherent agency. Although the draft attempts to expand apparent
authority to cover the present scope of inherent agency, this Note argues that
the Institute has not accomplished this goal and should reconsider its
approach.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency currently provides several
doctrines creating a principal's liability for its agent's conduct.' Like the
Restatement, this Note presents actual authority first.2 That doctrine holds a
principal liable to third parties transacting with the principal's agent when the
principal manifests authority to the agent to transact in the manner in
question.' The discussion of actual authority in this Note serves merely to
preface the focus on two other doctrines that the Second Restatement
articulates. Apparent authority creates a principal's liability to third parties
to whom the principal manifests that an agent has authority, even if the agent
really has no such authority.4 Inherent agency, on the other hand, requires no
manifestation. Instead, that doctrine imposes liability upon a principal when
a third party transacting with an agent is reasonable in believing that the agent
has authority, even if the agent has no authority and even if the principal
makes no manifestations that the agent has authority.'
1.

This Note focuses on the relationship between apparent authority and inherent agency.

Therefore, aside from the background discussion of actual authority, this Note discusses only
those two doctrines. The Note omits discussion of estoppel and ratification in Sections 8 B and

82, respectively, of the Second Restatement.
2.

Infra Part l.A.

3. See infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (listing requisite elements of actual
authority).
4. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (listing requisite elements of apparent
authority).
5. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (listing requisite elements of inherent
agency).
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Several scholars have criticized inherent agency heavily,6 especially its
ambiguity.' This criticism culminates in the elimination of inherent agency
in the current draft of the Restatement (Third) of Agency.' That draft claims
to expand the definition of "manifestation," thereby broadening apparent
6. See J.
DENNIS HYNES, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND THE LLC INANUTSHELL § 40, at
140 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that cases have expressed doubt about inherent agency, "perhaps
because it is unclear what interest of the third person is being protected and perhaps also
because it introduces uncertainty into an area of law that already has gone far in protecting the
third person's interests"); Steven A. Fishman, InherentAgency Power - Should Enterprise
Liability Apply toAgents' UnauthorizedContracts?, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 56 (1987) (noting that
benefits of inherent agency do not outweigh confusion that it creates and arguing against
broadening doctrine), Grace M. Giesel, Enforcement of Settlement Contracts: The Problem of
the Attorney Agent, 12 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 543, 563 (1999) (quoting Fishman and arguing
against expanding inherent agency to apply in attorney settlement context to bind principal
client in deal that agent attorney enters with third party); Komelia Dormire, Comment, Inherent
Agency Power: A Modest Proposalfor the RESATEam
(THpRD) OFAGENCY, 5 J.SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 243, 244 (2001) (noting that courts may not feel that inherent agency
accurately reflects current state of law).
7. See J. DENNIS HYNES, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 167 (1974) (identifying confusion
among actual authority, apparent authority, and inherent agency, in part because of unclear and
overlapping definitions, inconsistency by courts and authors, and lack of underlying agency law
principles); WIL.IAM A. KLEIN ET AL., AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LIMrrED LIABILrTY
ENTrImS 33 (2001) (calling inherent agency "a puzzling doctrine"); Deborah A. DeMott, A
Revised Prospectusfor a Third Restatement ofAgency, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1035, 1046
(1998) (noting that inherent agency generates considerable confusion); Giesel, supra note 6, at
563 (noting that courts have not used inherent agency often, and "even when courts mention the
doctrine, the discussion reveals courts' lack of understanding on how to use it"); Jeffrey A.
Parness & Austin W. Bartlett, Unsettling QuestionsRegarding Lawyer Civil Claim Settlement
Authority, 78 OR. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1999) (identifying ambiguity of attorney's express actual,
implied actual, apparent, and inherent authorities in settlement context); Philip T. Colton, Note,
Apparent Authority in Antitrust Law and Ruminations on a New Antitrust Theory: The
ImplicationsofAmerican Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 68 MINN.
L. REV. 439, 442 (1983) ("[C]ourts have often used the term 'apparent authority' to describe
any situation in which a principal is bound by the unauthorized conduct of its agent. Consistent
with section 8A of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, however, some courts now recognize
the 'inherent' [agency] power .... ."); Dormire, supra note 6, at 244 (recognizing less certainty
about inherent agency than about apparent and actual authority and concluding that courts may
not understand inherent agency). Ms. Dormire states, "The section ofthe Restatement (Second)
addressing inherent agency power has generated divergent opinions which may indicate... that
courts do not understand the section .... " Id. But see MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 11 (8th ed. 2000) (noting that inherent agency is
"relatively well established" even though "its exact contours are not always clear"); WlIIAM
A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 26, at 77 (3d ed. 2001) ("The limited
number ofjurisdictions adopting the [inherent agency] doctrine should not be taken as dissatisfaction with it, since there are few decisions, if any, rejecting it.").
8. See infra note 80 and accompanying text (citing elimination of inherent agency in
draft of Third Restatement).
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authority to include everything that inherent agency currently regulates.' This
Note rebuts that claim by arguing that apparent authority under the draft of the

Third Restatement does not, and cannot, embrace all of the cases in which a
principal would be liable based on inherent agency. First, Part II distinguishes
inherent agency from actual and apparent authority." Part III then analyzes
the treatment of inherent agency in the Third Restatement draft." Part IV

demonstrates that courts have been receptive to inherent agency. 2 Finally,
Part V argues that the elimination of inherent agency conflicts with precedent,
policy, and the purpose of Restatements.I 3

I. Overview of Agency Authority
A. Actual Authority

Actual authority is one means by which a third party may hold a principal
liable for its agent's conduct. The liability arises out of the principal's
manifestations to its agent that the agent has authority to act in a certain
manner.14 Actual authority requires (1) manifestations by the principal to the
agent'" that both (2) make it reasonable for the agent to believe that he had

authority16 and (3) are express (directly stated) or implied (such that the acts
are incidental to expressly authorized conduct). 7

9. See infra note 85 and accompanying text (analyzing attempt to expand "manifestation"
in draft of Third Restatement to allow apparent authority to govern all situations that inherent
agency current regulates).
10. See infra Parts lI.A-C (discussing actual authority, apparent authority, and inherent
agency); Part U.D (proving that apparent authority is merely subset of inherent agency).
11. See infra Part HI (analyzing elimination of inherent agency in draft of Third Restatement).
12. See infra Part IV (discussing cases in which courts identified inherent agency as
distinct doctrine and, in some instances, used inherent agency as basis for decisions).
13. See infra Part V (arguing against elimination of inherent agency based on case law
and policy).
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1957) ("Authority is the power of the
agent to affect the legal relations of the principal by acts done in accordance with the principal's
manifestations of consent to him.").
15. See id. (requiring "manifestations of consent to [agent]").
16.
See id. cmt. b (stating that "[m]anifestation . ..means conduct from which, in light
of the circumstances, it is reasonablefor another to infer consent") (emphasis added).
17. See id.cmt c (allowing implied as well as express manifestations). The comment
describes the distinction between express and implied manifestations as follows:
It is possible for a principal to specify minutely what the agent is to do. To the
extent that he does this, the agent may be said to have express authority. But most
authority is created by implication .... These powers are all implied or inferred
from the words used, from customs and from the relations of the parties. They are
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As for the manifestations by the principal to the agent, what the third
party knows or should know of the manifestations is immaterial." The only

concern of the manifestation requirement is the existence of such
manifestations, not the third party's awareness of them. 9 As for
reasonableness, the scope of actual authority is the reasonable belief by the
agent that the principal confers authority.2" Even when the principal intends
otherwise, if the agent reasonably believes that the principal intends to confer
authority, then the agent has actual authority, and the principal thereby

assumes liability."' That is, actual authority arises from an objective
manifestation, not the principal's subjective intent.
The third element allows communications from the principal to the agent

to be express or implied.22 Express communications include the actual terms

that the principal manifests to the agent, whether spoken or written. 23 In

addition to having such express actual authority, the agent also has authority

to perform acts incidental to specifically authorized acts.24 This authority is
implied, but still part of actual authority. 25 For instance, if the principal tells
the agent to deliver a package immediately, the agent may have implied actual
authority to take a cab to do so.26

described as "implied authority."
Id.
18. See EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 9 ("[]f an agent has actual authority, the principal
is bound even if the third person did not know that the agent had actual authority, and indeed
even if the third person thought the agent was herself the principal, not merely an agent.").
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 cmt. d (1957) ("The fact that the third
person with whom the agent deals on account of the principal has no knowledge of the manifestations of the principal... does not prevent the agent from having [actual] authority to make
the principal a party to the transaction... 1.
20. See supra note 16 (noting that Second Restatement defines reasonableness from
viewpoint of agent, not principal).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 cmt. b (1957) (noting that "agent's
21.
conduct is authorized if he is reasonable in drawing an inference that the principal intended him
so to act although that was not the principal's intent") (emphasis added).
22. See IntroductoryNote to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY ch. 2 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2001) (noting that draft "treats implied authority as an aspect of the scope of the agent's
actual authority").
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 cmt. c (1957) (labeling as express
authority those situations in which principal specifies what agent is to do).
24. See id. (noting that implication creates most authority).
25. See id. (noting that "[b]oth [express actual authority and implied actual authority] are
to be distinguished sharply from 'apparent' [authority] as it is used in Section 8").
26. WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 24-31 (1964) also
provides various examples of the implied actual authority that certain agents possess.
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B. ApparentAuthority
Apparent authority involves a principal's liability for its agent's conduct
arising from manifestations that the principal makes to a third party, not to the
agent." The elements of apparent authority are (1) manifestations by the
principal to the third party (whether directly or indirectly)" that (2) are the
source of"' (3) the third party's actual"0 and (4) reasonable" belief that the
agent has authority to act.32 The definition of "manifestation" with respect to
apparent authority is very broad and includes nonverbal communications. 33
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAENCY § 8 (1957) ("Apparent authority is the power
to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third persons, professedly as
agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the other's manifestations to such third
persons.")(emphasis added); HARRY 0. HENNAGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND OTHER UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 30 (1972) ("Apparent authority differs from actual (express or
implied) authority in that apparent authority arises... from what the 'principal' manifests to
the third person, while actual authority (express or implied) arises from what the principal
manifests to the agent.").
28. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (identifying requirement of manifestation
by principal to third person).
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1957) (noting that apparent authority
is power "arising from" manifestations to third party).
30. See id. cmt. a (noting that "apparent authority exists only with regard to those who
believe.., that there is authority"); id. cmt. c (stating that third person must actually believe
that agent had authority).
31.
See id. cmt. a (noting that "apparent authority exists only with regard to those who...
have reason to believe that there is authority"); id. cmt. c ("Apparent authority exists only to the
extent that it is reasonablefor the third person ... to believe that the agent is authorized.")
(emphasis added).
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1957) (providing four required
elements to create apparent authority). Section 27 reads as follows:
[Aipparent authority to do an act is created as to a third person by written or spoken
words or any other conduct [that is, manifestations] of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to believe that the principal consents to
have the act done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him.
Id.; see also DeMott, supra note 7, at 1047 ("Apparent authority holds the principal to the
consequences of the agent's conduct when a third party reasonably believes that the agent has
authority to do particular acts and that belief is traceable to conduct of the principal."); Bart
McKay, Note, Inherent Agency Powers: Does Celtic Life Insurance Co. v. Coats Open the
Door to a New Theory of Vicarious Liability in Texas?, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 449, 450 n. 12
(1994) (providing definition of apparent authority using same four elements, stating, "Apparent
authority is the authority which the third person dealing with the agent, [1] based upon
[2] representations the principal has made to the third party, [3] naturally and [4] reasonably
supposes the agent to possess").
33. See JOSEPH L. FRASCONA, AGENCY 31 (1964) (noting that definition of "manifestation" already is very broad in Second Restatement). In the actual authority context, Professor
Frascona recalls that "P's manifestation to A may consist of any conduct that causes A reason,
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By manifesting to the third party that an agent has authority, the principal
assumes liability for the agent's acts, even if the principal has not given
manifestations of authority to the agent himself.3 4 However, the third element
requires that the manifestation, not the agent's conduct, causes the third
party's belief that the agent has authority.3" If the agent's conduct alone
causes the third party's belief, even if that conduct would make everyone
reasonably believe that the agent has authority, then no apparent authority
exists."
Two points on apparent authority require elaboration. First, apparent
authority allows someone other than the principal himself to make the
manifestations from the principal to the third party.3" Therefore, the principal
could authorize the agent whose authority is in question to manifest his
authority to the third party.3" For example, the principal could instruct the
agent, "Tell the third party that you have authority to negotiate on my behalf,
but don't close the deal without my permission, and don't tell the third party
ably to believe that P desires him to be P's agent." Id. He then notes under apparent authority
that the principal should be liable for whatever "T reasonably can believe from P's manifestation to T that A may do[.] It is unimportant what P's intent is; what is important is T's reasonable belief from P's manifestation to T. .. ." Id. To underscore the breadth of the apparent
authority definition of "manifestation," Professor Frascona goes on to say, "As in [actual]
authority when P's manifestations are made to A, so in apparent authority P's manifestations
to T may be made in a variety of ways." Id. at 32. He notes that direct, indirect, oral, and
written communications, or any other conduct that reasonably conveys authority to the third
party, is a manifestation. Id.
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. a (1957) ("Apparent authority
results from a manifestation by a person that another is his agent, the manifestation being made
to a third person and not, as when [actual] authority is created, to the agent.").
35. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (requiring source of third party's belief to
be principal's manifestations).
36. See SEAVEY, supra note 26, § 8D (noting that apparent authority results from conduct
by principal to third party and stating that unauthorized statements by agent or another deceiver
are insufficient to give rise to apparent authority).
37. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 27 cmt. a (1957) (discussing manifestations that give rise to apparent authority). The comment identifies the different permissible
sources of manifestations as follows:
The information received by the third person may come directly from the principal
by letter or word of mouth, from authorized statements of the agent, from documents or other indicia of authority given by the principal to the agent, or from third
persons who have heard of the agent's authority through authorized or permitted
channels of communication.
Id.
38. Alternatively, another agent, different from the agent whose authority is in question,
could give the manifestations. That is, the principal could tell a second agent to tell the third
party that the first agent has authority to make a deal.
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that you lack closing authority." The agent, as instructed, tells the third party,
"I have authority to negotiate," and as instructed, he does not tell the third
party that he needs permission to close the deal.39 However, the agent closes
the deal without permission. Obviously, the agent has no actual authority to
close the deal.
Apparent authority, on the other hand, considers
communications from the principal to the third party, and it labels the agent's
communication in this example as one by the principal because the principal
instructed the agent to make it. Because the agent has express actual authority
to make that communication to the third party, that communication creates
apparent authority.
The second point that requires elaboration is to whom the principal must
make the manifestations. The principal need not focus its manifestations
directly at the third party. 40 Instead, the principal's public manifestations that
reach the third party suffice.4' The fact that principals need not direct
manifestations at a specific third party gives rise to a doctrine known as
"power of position."42 Pursuant to that doctrine, the principal's appointment
of the agent to particular positions is a manifestation that the agent has certain
accompanying authority. 43 Any third party who learns of that manifestation
may hold the principal liable for acts that customarily accompany the duties
of that position.44 The power of position doctrine applies even if that third
party does not know what customarily comes with the position.43
39. That is, the agent tells the third party everything that he is supposed to tell and
nothing more.
40. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF AGENCY § 8 cmt. b (1957) ("The manifestation of
the principal may be made directly to a third person, or may be made to the community .. ").
41.
Of course, if the principal makes such public manifestations, the third party still

actually must hear and believe them, as the third element requires. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 27 cmt. b (1957) notes, "The principal does not, and cannot, make a manifestation
'to the world.'" However, that comment does not make public manifestations that the third
party hears insufficient. It merely prevents a third party from arguing that the principal bound
itself by a manifestation to the entire world, even to a third party that-did not hear of the
manifestation. Although such manifestations to the world are insufficient, the third party could

learn of a manifestation directed at another or directed to the community-at-large, and such a
manifestation may establish apparent authority.
42. See EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 10 (describing "aspecial type of apparent authority
known as power ofposition" and citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 cmt. a, § 49
cmt. c (1957)); HYNES, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND TBE LLC 296-97 (LEXIS 5th ed. 1998)
(discussing "power of position argument").
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 cmt. a (1957) ("[A]pparent authority
can be created by appointing a person to a position, such as that of manager or treasurer ....
").
44. See id. ("[T]o those who know of the appointment there is apparent authority to do
the things ordinarily entrusted to one occupying such a position ....).
45. See id.cmt. d ("[A] manager has apparent authority to do those things which manag-
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When the principal appoints an agent to a position of power but intends
to limit the agent's powers to less than the customarily included powers, the
agent nonetheless receives apparent authority for those powers.4 s In fact, the
agent receives apparent authority for those customarily included powers even
when the principal explicitly tells him otherwise.47 For example, if a principal
tells its general purchasing agent not to purchase certain items, the agent
nonetheless has apparent authority to purchase those items.48 If the principal
wants to preclude its liability for the forbidden purchases, it must tell all
sellers of the products in question that the agent has no authority to make
those purchases.49

Certain conditions might prevent the creation of apparent authority based
on the power of position doctrine. First, when a principal publicly appoints
an agent to a position, a particular third party may use apparent authority only
if he actually knows of the appointment, just as the third party would have to
know of any verbal manifestation."0 Second, because apparent authority must
ers.. . customarily do, as to persons who know that he is a manager, although they do not know
what powers managers in such a business have."). Note, though, that the third party must still
know that the agent holds the position and holds it for a principal,even though he does not
need to know what that position customarily entails.
46. See id. § 49 cmt. c ("If a principal puts an agent into... a position in which.., it is
usual for such an agent to have a particular kind of authority, anyone dealing with him is
justified in inferring that he has such authority, in the absence of reason to know otherwise.").
Thus, the intent of the principal to limit the agent's power to less than what the position usually
includes is irrelevant.
47. See id. § 27 cmt. a (noting that agent has apparent authority to do things ordinarily
entrusted to one with such position, "regardless of unknown limitations which are imposed upon
the particular agent"). This result is due to apparent authority arising from the manifestation of
the appointment to the thirdparty, who here does not know of the limiting instructions. The
situation is different when the third party knows of the limiting instructions. See infra note 49
and accompanying text (noting that third party learning of limiting instructions that deny certain
usually included responsibilities results in lack of apparent authority for those denied responsibilities).
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY § 27 cmt. a illus. 8-9 (1957) (giving same
fact pattern and result).
49. When a principal tells a third party that the agent is not receiving responsibilities that
the position usually includes, that limitation is effective because it no longer is reasonable for
the third party to believe that the agent has the responsibilities in question. See id. § 49 cmt. c
(stating that agent receives customarily included responsibilities "in the absence of reason to
know otherwise"); id. § 49 ("[Mlanifestations of the principal to the [third] party . . . are
interpreted in light of what the [third] party knows. .. ").
50. See id. cmt. b ("[A]pparent authority exists only as to those who learn of a manifestation .... [U]ntil that [third] person learns facts from which he reasonably infers that the agent
is authorized, there is no apparent authority. . . ."); see also supra note 41 (noting insufficiency
of manifestations "to the world" of which third party is unaware).
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arise from a manifestation by the principal," no apparent authority exists
based on the power of position doctrine unless the third party knows that the
5 Finally, apparent
agent holds his positionfor aprincipal.
authority pursuant
to the power of position doctrine extends only to the powers customarily
included with the position; an agent acting outside of those bounds has no
apparent authority.53 For example, when an agent misrepresents to a third
party that he has authority exceeding the customary powers of his position, no
apparent authority exists, even if the third party's belief is reasonable.54
C. Inherent Agency
The inherent agency doctrine is a third means by which a third party may
hold a principal liable for its agent's conduct." Pursuant to the inherent
agency doctrine, a principal need not give any manifestations, whether to a
third party or to an agent, that the agent has authority.56 If the third party
actually believes that the agent has such authority from the principal, and if
that belief is objectively reasonable, then the principal is liable for the agent's
conduct, despite the lack of manifestations of authority.57 A determination of
51.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing requirement that apparent
authority must come from manifestation by principal to third party).
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. a (1957) ("[T]here can be no
apparent authority created by an undisclosed principal.").
53. See SEAVEY, supra note 26, § 22B ("Persons dealing with an agent... cannot hold
the principal liable for unauthorized acts of an agent which are not normally permitted to an
agent in such a position.").
54.
Because the position in this example does not customarily include the authority in
question, no apparent authority exists. As noted later, inherent agency covers these situations.
See infra Part II.C (discussing inherent agency).
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 8 A (1957) ("Inherent agency power is...
the power of an agent which is derived not from [actual] authority, apparent authority or
estoppel, but solely from the agency relation and exists for the protection of persons harmed by
or dealing with a servant or other agent.").
56. See id. cmt. b (noting that inherent agency power in contracts realm "is based neither
upon the consent of the principal nor upon his manifestations").
57. See HYNES, supra note 7, at 211-12 (citing example of inherent agency that Section
161 of Second Restatement provides and noting that "[t]he only limitation stated in Section 161
is that the third party must 'reasonably believe' that the agent is authorized"); Colton, supra
note 7, at 443 (stating that inherent agency powers "include all powers that a third party would
reasonably suppose the agent to have"); Dormire, supra note 6, at 248 (citing case law suggesting that "the third party needed to show only that he acted reasonably" to establish inherent
agency). But see EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 13 (defining reasonableness from principal's
viewpoint). Eisenberg argues that the test for inherent authority is whether "a reasonable person
in the principal's position [would] have foreseen that, despite his instructions, there was a
significant likelihood that the agent would act as he did." Id. However, Eisenberg cites no
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reasonableness requires an examination of whether the acts in question are a
continuation of prior authorized acts of the agent, whether a trust relationship
already exists between the third party and the agent, and whether the agent has
done anything to make the third party's belief unreasonable. 8
Inherent agency falls within a complex yet organized framework into
which the Second Restatement divides the liability of principals. The highest
level of division is between contracts and torts," and this Note discusses only
the realm of contracts.' The Second Restatement next divides the contracts
cases by whether the principal is disclosed or undisclosed6' and then, for each
category, by whether the agent has authority or has no authority. 2 Inherent
agency involves agents without authority acting on behalf of either disclosed
or undisclosed principals. Apparent authority also involves agents without
authority, but only those acting on behalf of disclosed principals.63 Finally,
regardless of whether the principal is disclosed or undisclosed, the
Restatement separates inherent agency cases involving a "general agent" from
those involving a "special agent."' The Second Restatement provides a fairly
authority for his definition, and the other authorities in this footnote demonstrate the prevailing
view.
58. See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text (discussing use by one court of these
three considerations to determine reasonableness, but noting that this list of considerations
might not be exhaustive).
59. Chapter 6 of the Second Restatement discusses holding principals liable to third
persons in the contracts setting. Chapter 7 discusses the liability in the torts setting. These two
chapters discuss actual authority, apparent authority, and inherent agency. However, Chapter 3
discusses creation of actual and apparent authority, and Chapter 5 discusses termination of
actual and apparent authority, whereas no other chapter specifically discusses creation or
termination of inherent agency.
60. Most inherent agency cases discuss the doctrine in the contracts realm. However, one
could gather cases and frame similar arguments in the torts realm. This Note leaves that task
for another day.
61.
Topic 2 of Chapter 6 discusses liability in contract for disclosed or at least partially
disclosed principals. Topic 3 discusses liability in contract for undisclosed principals.
62. Titles A and C of Topic 2 divide liability in contract for disclosed principals based
on whether the agent had authority or no authority, respectively. Titles A and B of Topic 3
make the same division for undisclosed principals.
63. When the principal is undisclosed, he cannot manifest authority to the third party to
satisfy the requisite manifestation element. Therefore, Title C (unauthorized agent) of Topic 2
(disclosed principals) does discuss apparent authority, whereas Title B (unauthorized agent) of
Topic 3 (undisclosed principals) does not.
64. Sections 161 and 161 A consider the inherent agency power of general agents and
special agents, respectively, within the unauthorized agent and disclosed principal contractual
liability arena. Sections 194 and 195 A consider the inherent agency power of general agents
and special agents, respectively, within the unauthorized agent and undisclosed principal
contractual liability arena.
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straightforward distinction between general agents and special agents.
General agents are those authorized to conduct a series of transactions
involving a continuity of service, whereas special agents are those with
authority to conduct only a single transaction or series of transactions not

involving a continuity of service.6"

D. Apparent Authority as a Subset of InherentAgency
A comparison of the elements of inherent agency and apparent authority
reveals an interesting corollary that both scholars and courts have overlooked.
As noted above,' apparent authority arises only when the facts of the case
satisfy four properties: (1) manifestations by the principal to the third party
(whether direct or indirect) that (2) are the source of (3) the third party's
actual and (4) reasonable belief that the agent has authority to act.67 Inherent
agency requires satisfaction of only two of these properties: (1) the third
party's actual and (2) reasonable belief that the agent has authority to act."
Because apparent authority requires both inherent agency properties, apparent
authority is a subset of inherent agency.69 That is, if apparent authority
applies to a case, the facts must satisfy the four apparent authority properties,
which means that the facts satisfy the actual and reasonable belief properties,
which means that inherent agency also applies. The converse is not true. An
agent who satisfies both inherent agency properties might not satisfy the other
two apparent authority properties, so apparent authority might not apply every
RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 3 (1957).
66. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (listing four required elements of
apparent authority).
That is, let Um = (A n B n C n D), where U. represents the universe of cases in
67.
which apparent authority is applicable, A represents the universe of cases in which the third
party has actual belief, B represents the universe of cases in which the third party has reasonable
belief, C represents the universe of cases in which the principal makes manifestations, and D
represents the universe of cases in which the manifestations cause the third party's belief. (A
n B n C n D) is the intersection ofA, B, C, and D, or the universe of cases in which the facts
satisfy all four properties. In other words, the universe of cases in which apparent authority is
applicable consists of those cases in which the facts satisfy these four properties.
68. That is, let UA = (A nBJ, where Ua represents the universe of cases in which inherent
agency is applicable, A represents the universe of cases in which the third party has actual belief,
and B represents the universe of cases in which the third party has reasonable belief. (A n B)
is the intersection ofA and B, or the universe of cases in which the facts satisfy both properties.
In other words, the universe of cases in which inherent agency is applicable consists of those
cases in which the facts satisfy both properties.
69. A fundamental axiom of set theory posits that (X n 1}) IX). Applying this law to
the relationship between apparent authority and inherent agency, UM = (A n B n C n D) =
((A nB) n (C nD)) c ((A oB)) = (A oB) = UL. That is, apparent authority is only a subset
of inherent agency.
65.
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time that inherent agency applies. Because apparent authority is a subset of
inherent agency, the draft of the Third Restatement correctly finds that an
expansion of apparent authority would be necessary to cover the entire scope
of inherent agency.7" This Note suggests that the "expansion" of apparent
authority in the Third Restatement draft arguably is no expansion at all," and
that the elimination of inherent agency in the draft of the Third Restatement
inappropriately changes the outcome of many inherent agency cases.72
II1. Overview ofthe Draft of the ThirdRestatement ofAgency
The American Law Institute (ALl) released the draft of the first two
chapters of the Restatement (Third) of Agency on March 20, 2000."3 On
March 14, 2001, the ALI published changes to these two chapters, as well as
the preliminary text for two additional chapters.74 The most recent draft,

including one additional chapter and revisions to three earlier chapters,
became available on March 18, 2002."s

This Note presents an exhaustive analysis of the treatment of inherent
agency in the draft of the Third Restatement.76 Only two articles in the last
thirty years have thoroughly analyzed the inherent agency doctrine, 7 and only
a handful of additional articles in that time have discussed it."s The only

70. See infra note 85 and accompanying text (identifying "expansion" of apparent
authority in draft of Third Restatement).
71.
See infra notes 87-88, 100 and accompanying text (showing that apparent authority
in Second Restatement already encompasses "expansions" in draft of Third Restatement).
72. See infra Part VA (discussing inherent agency cases that would yield different results
under draft of Third Restatement).
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2000).
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (Tentative Draft No. 2,2001).
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (Tentative Draft No. 3,2002).
76. Because the third tentative draft of the Third Restatement does not mention inherent
agency, this Note exhaustively reviews the doctrine even without citations to that tentative draft.
77. See Fishman, supra note 6, at 1-59 (providing in-depth analysis of inherent agency
doctrine and arguing against its further adoption by courts); Dormire, supra note 6, at 243-63
(distinguishing inherent agency from actual and apparent authority and arguing that Third
Restatement draft should clarify ambiguity surrounding inherent agency doctrine).
78. See DeMott, supra note 7, at 104647 (providing brief discussion of elimination of
inherent agency in prospectus for Third Restatement); Giesel, supra note 6, at 562-63 (arguing
that courts should not apply inherent agency to bind client in settlement context); Pamess &
Bartlett, supra note 7, at 1092-93 (discussing courts' use of inherent agency to bind client in
settlement agreement despite ethics rules preventing attorneys from entering such agreements
without authority); Paul A. Quiros et al., Annual Survey of Georgia Law June 1, 1999 - May
31, 2000 Survey Articles: Business Associations, 52 MERCER L. REV. 95, 132-33 (2000)
(discussing application of inherent agency in one Georgia case); Colton, supra note 7, at 442-
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article published after the issuance of the Third Restatement draft is a note by
Kornelia Dormire. However, because she wrote that work prior to the
issuance of the Third Restatement draft, she did not have the opportunity to
discuss the treatment of inherent agency in that draft."9 Hence, no article has
discussed the elimination of inherent agency in the draft of the Third
Restatement.
The reporter clearly states on several occasions that the draft eliminates
the inherent agency doctrine."0 In addition to these cursory dismissals of the
doctrine, the reporter also provides substantive discussion of changes to the

Second Restatement that affect inherent agency."' The first substantive
treatment of inherent agency is the reporter's discussion of the new definition
of "manifestation" in the Restatement. In Section 1.02 of her memorandum
to the first draft, the reporter states one reason for the elimination of inherent
agency. Because the Second Restatement does not define "manifestation," a
required element for apparent authority, she observes that various implicit
definitions have arisen."2 The reporter asserts that courts, prior to the
formation of inherent agency, used these implicit definitions of
"manifestation" to apply apparent authority only to cases involving specific

43, 462 (discussing inherent agency and analyzing one case based on apparent authority in
which inherent agency was more applicable); McKay, supra note 32, at 449-61 (discussing
recent adoption of inherent agency in Texas and arguing that breadth of that adoption gives
inherent agency too much reign).
79. See Dormire, supra note 6, at 252 n.52 (stating that no draft yet existed when Ms.
Dormire wrote her note).
80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1,2000)
(citing definition of inherent agency in Section 8 A of Second Restatement, acknowledging
elimination of doctrine in this draft, and claiming that "[o]ther doctrines stated in this Restatement encompass the justifications underpinning [inherent agency], including the importance of
interpretation by the agent in the agent's relationship with the principal, as well as the doctrines
of apparent authority, estoppel, and restitution"); RESTATEMENT (THUW) OF AGENcY § 2.01 cmt.
b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001) (same); Reporter'sMemorandum to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

AGENCY xiii, xvii (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2000) (noting that draft does not use inherent agency
because "[o]ther doctrines, as restated and clarified, cover the situations in which inherent
agency power was said to explain the outcome"); IntroductoryNote to RESTATEMEmT (THIRD)

OF AGENCY ch. 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2000) (jus*fying elimination of inherent agency
because "[s]ituations that inherent agency power is said to govern are covered herein by other
doctrines, as explained specifically where relevant"); Introductory Note to RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY ch. 2 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001) (same).

81. See infra notes 82-105 and accompanying text (discussing substantive treatment of
inherent agency in Third Restatement draft).
82.

See Reporter'sMemorandum to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY xiii, xvi (Tenta-

tive Draft No. 1, 2000) (noting that Second Restatement left "manifestation" undefined and
stating that "implicit definitions became operative").
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communications directly to a third party."3 This restriction on apparent
authority led to the creation of inherent agency, a doctrine that the courts
could apply in the absence of such specific, direct communications.84 Rather
than retain inherent agency, the reporter instead attempts to expand the
definition of "manifestation" for apparent authority purposes to include

situations without verbal communications, such as appointments of agents to
certain positions. 5 The reporter believes that the expanded definition of
"manifestation" matches the definition that the courts already have applied.86
The "expansion" of apparent authority to include inherent agency
arguably is no expansion at all. As noted previously, the reporter identifies
only two "expansions" - namely, nonverbal communications and
appointments by a principal of an agent to a position - as manifestations.8 7
However, under current law the definition of "manifestation" is already very
broad and includes both of these "expansions."8 Furthermore, this Note
83. See id. ("[S]ome courts assumed that to create apparent authority it was essential that
the principal make a specific communication directly to the third party.").
84. See id. ("This in turn led to the perceived need for the doctrine of inherent agency
power, as stated in Restatement Second, Agency § 8 A.").
85. See id. ("In contrast, this section [1.02] defines manifestation broadly and explains
how the concept [of apparent authority] applies when a person is appointed to a position."). The
second draft maintains the same position, arguing as follows:
The definition of manifestation in this section is intended to be broader than that
assumed to be operative at points in the Restatement Second of Agency. The
principal consequence of this breadth is to eliminate the rationale for a distinct
doctrine of inherent-agency power applicable to disclosed principals when the agent
disregards instructions or oversteps actual authority ....
In this Restatement,
conduct may constitute a manifestation sufficient to create apparent authority even
though it does not use the word "authority" and even though it does not consist of
words targeted specifically to a third party.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.03 reporter's note a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001).
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.02 reporter's note a (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2000) (citing Second Restatement). The reporter here notes that the main effect of broadening
the definition of "manifestation" is to eliminate inherent agency. Id. She observes that comment b to Second Restatement Section 8 A states that courts have relied on apparent authority
at times when inherent agency is more applicable. Id. Whereas the Second Restatement
restricted the definition of "manifestation" to make apparent authority in such situations
inapplicable, the reporter takes the opposite position in the tentative drafts of the Third Restatement. "In this Restatement, conduct may constitute a manifestation sufficient to create apparent
authority even though it does not use the word 'authority' and even though it does not consist
of words targeted specifically to a third party." Id.
87. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (noting that Third Restatement draft only
expands definition of "manifestation" to include power of position doctrine and nonverbal
manifestations).
88. See supra notes 33, 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing apparent authority and
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argues that apparent authority, despite its inclusion of the power of position
doctrine and allowance of nonverbal manifestations, still does not apply to all
situations that inherent agency currently covers. 9 Inherent agency did not
originate from a definition of "manifestation" that was too narrow. Rather,
inherent agency holds the principal liable so long as the third party's belief is
reasonable, even if the principal has made no manifestations whatsoever
(including appointments to positions and nonverbal communications)."
The reporter's second substantive treatment of the elimination of inherent
agency is a discussion of Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc.91 and Croisant v.
Watrud, 2 both inherent agency cases.93 The discussion suggests some
possible confusion in the draft regarding inherent agency. First, when citing
Koval, the reporter refers to inherent agency as synonymous with implied
actual authority,94 whereas the two actually are wholly distinct doctrines.95
Second, the reporter's analysis of these cases falls under Section 3.03, entitled
"Creation of Apparent Authority." ' This section requires, among other
elements, a manifestation by the principal that the agent has authority.'
showing that nonverbal communications, including appointments of agents to certain positions,
fall within realm of apparent authority); see also infra note 100 and accompanying text (showing that Third Restatement draft and Second Restatement require same four elements to create
apparent authority, and therefore draft of Third Restatement arguably does not expand apparent
authority at all).
89. See infra Part V.A (identifying cases in which courts imposed liability based on
inherent agency but which would yield different results under draft of Third Restatement,
despite "expansions" of apparent authority).
90. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (listing requisite elements of inherent
agency and showing that manifestations are unnecessary).
91. 693 N.E.2d 1299 (Ind. 1998).
92. 432 P.2d 799 (Or. 1967).
93. See infra notes 147-72, 185-93 and accompanying text (discussing facts and reasoning
in Croisantand Koval, respectively, and demonstrating that court in both cases applied inherent
agency rather than apparent authority).
94. See RESTATEMIENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 reporter's note e, at 182 (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2000) (referring to inherent agency power and implied actual authority synonymously); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 reporter's note b, at 262 (Tentative Draft
No. 2,2001) (same).
95. Implied actual authority, as part of actual authority, considers manifestations by the
principal to the agent. See supra notes 15-17, 25 and accompanying text (listing requisite
elements of actual authority and noting that implied actual authority falls within that category).
Inherent agency does not require any manifestations and looks at the third party, not the
principal and not the agent. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (listing requisite
elements of inherent agency).
96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 (Tentative Draft No. 2,2001).
97. See id. (stating that apparent authority requires, among other things, principal's
manifestation).
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However, the holding of these cases is that inherent agency liability requires
no manifestation whatsoever, and therefore an elimination of inherent agency
in favor of apparent authority which does require a manifestation would yield
different results in both cases." Both drafts make each of these two errors. 99
However, the reporter's discussion of these two cases appears to have a
larger underlying error. The section that analyzes these eases underscores the
fact that the draft of the Third Restatement arguably does not expand the
concept of apparent authority at all. The requirements in Section 3.03 of the
draft are the exact same four requirements in the Second Restatement namely, manifestations by the principal that cause the third party's actual and
reasonable belief that the agent has authority."0
The third substantive mention of inherent agency falls under the
discussion of estoppel of an undisclosed principal. Apparent authority is
inapplicable in situations involving an undisclosed principal because third
parties cannot trace any manifestations to a principal."1 As a corollary, the
power of position doctrine is inapplicable because the third party does not
know that the agent holds his position on behalf of a principal." ° Inherent
agency currently regulates situations involving an undisclosed principal. 10 3
98. See infra notes 282-85, 291-95 and accompanying text (explaining why Croisantand
Koval, respectively, would have different results under draft of Third Restatement without

inherent agency).
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 reporter's note b, at 262, reporter's
note e(2), at 271 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001) (discussing Koval and Croisant cases, respectively); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 reporter's note e, at 182, reporter's note i(2),
at 196 (Tentative Draft No. 1,2000) (same).
100.
Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001)
("Apparent authority... is created by a person's manifestation that another has authority.. . if
a third party reasonably believes the actor to be authorized and the belief is traceable to the
manifestation.") with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1957) ("[A]pparent authority
to do an act is created [by] conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the
third person to believe that the principal consents to have the [agent] act for him.").
101.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. a (1957) ("[Tlhere can be no
apparent authority created by an undisclosed principal."); Dormire, supra note 6, at 246
(identifying manifestation by principal as requirement for apparent authority and concluding
that "there can be no aparent authority by an undisclosed principal"); supra notes 27-28 and
accompanying text (listing manifestation by principal to third party as requirement for apparent
authority).
102. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining inapplicability of power of
position doctrine in situations involving undisclosed principals).
103. See DeMott, supra note 7, at 1047 (acknowledging placement of undisclosed
principals under inherent agency because of lack of manifestation by principal). DeMott states,
"Inherent agency power explains why courts might hold an undisclosed principal liable when
the agent exceeds the scope of actual authority, in such a relationship, because third parties are
unaware that their liaison is anyone's agent, the definition of apparent authority in Restatement
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To preserve regulation of undisclosed principals despite the elimination of
inherent agency, the reporter places such cases under estoppel." ° Despite the
shift from inherent agency to estoppel, the reporter maintains the position
from the Second Restatement that the only requirement to impose liability on
an undisclosed principal is the third party's reasonable belief ° '
The reporter of the draft of the Third Restatement also has issued a
prospectus for the draft,"° one section of which deals with inherent agency." °
She defines inherent agency"~ and then lists some of its contributions to
agency law,"° such as its regulation of undisclosed principals." 0 The reporter
then cites two potential problems with inherent agency."' First, she notes that
some courts incorrectly have applied apparent authority rather than inherent
agency. 12 The reporter suggests that those incorrect expansions of apparent

authority have caused that doctrine to overtake inherent agency." 3 However,

this incorrect expansion of apparent authority is not a problem with inherent
agency but rather a problem with the courts' interpretation of apparent
authority. Furthermore, the reporter's claim that apparent authority has
overtaken inherent agency is a non sequitur. As noted above, apparent

(Second) is inapplicable." Id.
104. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFAGENCY § 2.06 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001)
(noting that situations involving undisclosed principals currently fall under inherent agency, but
because of elimination of inherent agency, draft places them under rule of estoppel in that
section); id. § 2.06 reporter's note a (stating that Sections 194 and 195 of Second Restatement,
which deal with undisclosed principals, are examples of inherent agency); id. § 2.06 reporter's
note c, at 213 (citing Watteau v. Fenwick, I Q.B. 346 (1893) as one example involving
undisclosed principal that RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 195 cmt. b (1957) places
under inherent agency).
105. See id. § 2.06 (placing liability upon principal if third party's belief of agent's
authority was reasonable). Section 2.06, entitled "Estoppel of Undisclosed Principal," states,
"An undisclosed principal may not rely on instructions given an agent that qualify or reduce the
agent's authority to less than the authority a third party would reasonably believe the agent to
have under the same circumstances if the principal had been disclosed." Id.
106. DeMott, supra note 7.
107. See id. at 1046-50 (discussing inherent agency).
108. See id. at 1046 (citing basis for inherent agency in Second Restatement).
109. See id. at 1047 (observing that "contributions [of inherent agency] to agency doctrine
are worth noting").
110. See supranotes 101 -03 and accompanying text (showing why apparent authority does
not apply to undisclosed principals and stating that inherent agency regulates such situations).
111.
See DeMott, supra note 7, at 1047 (noting that treatment of inherent agency in Second
Restatement "is problematic in two respects").
112. See id. (noting that "contemporary cases broadly define... apparent authority").
113. See id. (arguing that apparent authority, through developments and expansions, "may
have overtaken the doctrine of inherent agency power").
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authority is a subset of inherent agency. 14 Any case that satisfies the apparent
authority requirements also satisfies the inherent agency requirements.
Therefore, apparent authority could not have "overtaken" inherent agency,
regardless of any expansion of apparent authority.
The second potential problem that the reporter articulates regarding
inherent agency arguably is also inaccurate. The reporter notes that inherent
agency exists for the protection of the third party dealing with the agent."'
She characterizes this statement as "misleading" because inherent agency
might also work for the principal's benefit." 6 However, the doctrine may
incidentally benefit the principal and still have the primary purpose of
assisting the third party. The two ideas are not mutually exclusive.
Aside from these two potential problems, the reporter possibly creates
further confusion in her prospectus by incorrectly applying inherent agency
to a case that apparent authority should control. She discusses those situations
in which a third party reasonably believes that the agent has authority
although the principal does not intend to grant authority.' In such situations,
she applies inherent agency if the third party's belief arises from the agent's
position, whereas she applies apparent authority if the third party's belief
arises from the principal's manifestation."' However, the appointment of the
agent to his position is a manifestation by the principal to the third party, so
the third party's belief in both examples arises from the principal's
manifestation, and therefore apparent authority applies regardless of whether
the principal intends otherwise." 9 For this reason, apparent authority, not
inherent agency, should control the second example as well as the first.

114. See supra Part Hl.D (noting that apparent authority elements include inherent agency
elements and therefore apparent authority is subset of inherent agency).
115. See DeMott, supra note 7, at 1046-50 (citing observation in Second Restatement that
inherent agency "exists for the protection of persons harmed by or dealing with a servant or
other agent").
116. See id. (characterizing assertion in Second Restatement that inherent agency exists
for protection of third party as "misleading" because principal could use doctrine to bind third
party).
117. See id. at 1050 (discussing situations involving "authority that third parties might
mistakenly yet reasonably believe the principal conferred upon the agent").
118. See id. (noting that such authority "derives either from the position in which the
principal places the agent and the customary powers of that position (inherent agency power)
or from the principal's manifestations to third parties ...(apparent authority)"). The prospectus
provides no case law to support this statement.
119. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (noting that power of position doctrine, as
part of apparent authority, applies when third party's belief comes from agent's position, even
if principal did not intend to give agent all authorities of that position).
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This misapplication of inherent agency is another reason why the ALl

perhaps should reconsider its elimination of inherent agency. Claims that the

draft expands apparent authority appear to be inaccurate, 2° and even with
such an expansion, apparent authority would still be a subset of inherent
agency that could not encompass the inherent agency doctrine."' The draft

also refers to inherent agency and implied actual authority synonymously122

and justifies its position with cases that would come out differently under the

draft.123 The following Part presents cases demonstrating that courts have
recognized inherent agency as a distinct doctrine,' after which the Note
argues that the elimination of inherent agency contradicts precedent, policy,
and the purpose of Restatements.'
IV InherentAgency as a Distinct Category

A. Case Law CorrectlyDistinguishingInherent Agency
from Actual and ApparentAuthority
In several cases, courts either based their decisions on inherent agency
despite the inapplicability of apparent authority or based their decisions on
another theory but correctly identified inherent agency and explained its
inapplicability. The purpose of analyzing these cases is twofold. First, the

analysis shows that inherent agency is a distinct legal doctrine, making any
elimination of the doctrine not merely a restatement but rather a substantive
change in the law.'26 Second, it proves that courts recognize the doctrine,
making any elimination of the doctrine a departure from precedent. 27

120. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (showing that attempt by draft to
expand apparent authority to encompass inherent agency arguably results in no expansion at
all).
121.
See supra Part II.D (proving that apparent authority remains subset of inherent agency
as long as apparent authority elements include elements of inherent agency).
122. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (identifying reference to inherent
agency as synonymous with implied actual authority but demonstrating how these two doctrines
are wholly distinct).
123. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text (noting that draft discusses Koval and
Croisant but showing that both cases would yield different results under draft).
124. Infra Parts IV.A, C.
125. See infra Part V (supporting retention of inherent agency as distinct doctrine).
126. See infra Part V.B (suggesting that elimination of inherent agency is substantive
change in law and therefore inappropriate for Restatement).
127. See infra Part VA (suggesting that elimination of inherent agency conflicts with
precedent).
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1. Three Early Cases
Although the Second Restatement is the first official text to coin the
phrase "inherent agency power,' 28 the logic behind the doctrine preceded that
work by three-quarters of a century. Thurber & Co. v. Anderson, 129 a
nineteenth century case, applied the concept of inherent agency to hold
undisclosed principals liable, and an English court soon thereafter adopted
similar reasoning in Watteau v. Fenwick."30 Although scholars attribute the
3
establishment of inherent agency in the Second Restatement to Watteau,' 1
numerous cases since that decision have accepted the doctrine, 3 2 Croisantv.
Watrud'33 being the first to receive academic recognition. The following
analysis examines the reasoning of these three early cases.
Thurber & Co. v. Anderson' involved a defendant principal in the
grocery business and its agent who ordered cigars and ale by mail.' 35 The

principal remained undisclosed because the transaction was by mail, thereby
rendering apparent authority, including the power of position doctrine,
inapplicable.'36 Nonetheless, the court held that the principal had to pay for
the goods.'3 7 The court imposed liability because the principal put the agent

into surroundings that allowed him to represent to others that he had authority
to make the purchase. 38
128. See GREGORY, supra note 7, § 26, at 77 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 8 A (1957) and stating that "[t]he term 'inherent agency power' was first used in the Restatement"); SEAVEY, supra note 26, § 8F (noting that inherent agency power "is a term first used
in the Restatement of Agency, 2d, Section 8 A").
129. 88 111.
167 (1878).
130.
1 Q.B. 346 (1893).
131. See HYNES, supra note 7, at 211 (stating in notes following Watteau that "[t]he
Restatement sections on inherent agency power adopt the rationale of this case").
132. The quick and widespread acceptance of the doctrine shows that the decision to adopt
inherent agency, whether or not correct at the time of the Second Restatement, should receive
respect as precedent. See infra Part V.A (suggesting that elimination of inherent agency
conflicts with precedent).
133. 432 P.2d 799 (Or. 1967).
134. 88 Ill.
167 (1878).
167, 168 (1878).
Thurber & Co. v. Anderson, 88 Ill.
135.
136. See Fishman, supra note 6, at 11 ("Applying apparent authority in this case is
difficult, since the third party dealt directly with the agent by mail and never directly observed
the agent's relationship to the establishment. Thus, the principal made no manifestation.");
supra note 101 and accompanying text (showing inapplicability of apparent authority when
principal is undisclosed).
137. See Thurber, 88 111. at 169 (placing liability upon principal defendants).
138. See id. ("By permitting another to hold himself out to the world as his agent, the
principal adopts his acts, and will be held bound to the person who gives credit thereafter to the
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An English court subsequently adopted the same reasoning. In Watteau
v. Fenwick, 9 the defendant principals had appointed an agent as manager of
their pub but subsequently restricted his power to purchase certain
beverages. 4 ° This manager purchased the beverages from the plaintiff third
party, but the defendants refused to pay for them. 41 Clearly no actual
authority existed. 42 Apparent authority also was inapplicable because the

third party's belief arose from manifestations by the agent, not the
principals. 43 Indeed, the principals were undisclosed and therefore could
have made no manifestations traceable to them,' 44 thereby precluding the
the court found the
applicability of apparent authority. 4 Nonetheless,
46
principals liable based on an inherent agency theory.
Croisant v. Watrud'47 is one of the first cases in which a court correctly
chose to apply the inherent agency section in the Second Restatement.1 4 The
other....").
1 Q.B. 346 (1893).
139.
140. Watteau v. Fenwick, 1 Q.B. 346, 346 (1893).
141. Id.
142. See id. ("Under the terms of the agreement made between [agent] and [principal]
defendants, the former had no [actual] authority to buy any goods for the business except
bottled ales and mineral waters .... ").
143. See id. at 348 (noting that principals allowed agent to hold himself out as proprietor
of business).
144. See id. at 347 ("[T]here is no holding out by the principal .... They are in fact
");id. at 347-48 (comparing this case to prior case in which "there
undisclosed principals ....
was no holding out of the manager as an agent, it was the simple case of an agent being allowed
to act as the ostensible principal [himself] without any disclosure to the world of there being any
one behind him").
145. See supra notes 101-03, 110 and accompanying text (showing that inherent agency,
not apparent authority, applies to undisclosed principals).
146. See Watteau v. Fenwick, I Q.B. 346,348 (1893) ("All that the plaintiff has to do...
in order to charge the principals, is to shew that the goods supplied were . . . within the
reasonable scope of the agent's authority.") (emphasis added). The court noted that the
principals here "enable[d] their agent to hold himself out to the world as the proprietor," and
that the third party in such cases needs only to show that he was reasonable in thinking that the
agent had the authority in question. Id.
147. 432 P.2d 799 (Or. 1967).
148.
Some cases preceding Croisant applied inherent agency. See, e.g., Local Joint
Executive Bd., Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union v. Nationwide Downtowner
Motor Inns, 229 F. Supp. 413, 414-15 (W.D. Mo. 1964) (determining that general manager had
apparent authority and inherent agency power to bind his principal corporation in contract);
Cote Bros. v. Granite Lake Realty Corp., 193 A.2d 884, 886 (N.H. 1963) (determining that
financial manager had inherent agency power to purchase ordinary supplies); Holman-Baker
Co. v. Pre-Design, Inc., 179 A.2d 454,456 (N.H. 1962) (using inherent agency power to hold
undisclosed principal corporation liable for contract signed by its
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plaintiffthird party in Croisant hired the defendant accounting firm to provide
her with tax advice and to complete her tax forms.'49 The plaintiff then hired
LaVem Watrud, an accountant with the defendant firm, not only to continue
doing her taxes but also to make collections under a sale of one of her
properties. 5 ° When the plaintiff moved to another state, she also gave Watrud
responsibility for maintaining her financial records in addition to his previous

tax and collection responsibilities."' The plaintiff, to no avail, reprimanded
Watrud for making unauthorized payments on her accounts (including some
payments to himself)." 2 After Watrud suffered a fatal hunting wound, the
plaintiff sought to hold Watrud's accounting firm liable for an accounting.' 53
Clearly the situation involved no express actual authority because the firm
never expressly allowed Watrud to assume the added responsibilities. 54 If
accountants commonly handled funds, there could have been common
knowledge to that effect, in which case the firm's manifestation to Watrud in
appointing him as an accountant could have caused Watrud to believe that he

had implied actual authority to handle funds. ' However, the court found "no
basis for saying that accountants commonly or frequently perform fundhandling services."'5 6 Similarly, if it were common knowledge that
accountants handled funds, the firm's appointment ofWatrud as an accountant
could have been a manifestation to the plaintiff third party that created
apparent authority pursuant to the power of position doctrine.' But again, the
president/treasurer/director/manager).
However, Croisant was the first case that received
substantial recognition. See HYNES, supra note 42, at 323-36 (discussing inherent agency and
citing Croisantas first post-Second Restatement case); supra notes 91-94 and accompanying
text (noting that draft of Third Restatement cites and discusses Croisant as one example of
inherent agency).
149. Croisant v. Watrud, 432 P.2d 799, 800 (Or. 1967).
150. Id.
151.
Id.
152. Id.
153.
Id.
154. Id. at 801 ("It is clear that Watrud had no express authority from defendants to
perform these services.").
155. See id.("If it were common knowledge that accountants frequently [performed these
duties], we would be in a position to take judicial notice of the common practice and thus find
an implied authority . . . ."). One may have implied actual authority for acts that usually
accompany the expressly authorized acts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 35 (1957)
(interpreting implied actual authority to include "acts which are incidental to [a transaction],
usually accompany it, or are reasonably necessary to accomplish it"); supra notes 24-26 and
accompanying text (discussing and providing example of implied actual authority).
156. Croisant v. Watrud, 432 P.2d 799, 801 (Or. 1967).
157. See id. ("If it were common knowledge..., we would be in a position to... find...
apparent authority."). One may have apparent authority based on the power of position doctrine
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court found that accountants customarily did not handle funds, and therefore
there could be no common knowledge to that effect."' The court identified no
other manifestations by the principal that could have given rise to apparent
authority. 159
The court instead imposed liability on the defendants under a theory of
"inherent agency power. '" "6 As noted above, the only requirements to
establish inherent agency power are the third party's actual and reasonable
belief that the agent has the authority in question."' Courts do not determine
reasonableness from accountants' opinions about what their authority usually
includes, but rather fromthe facts inthe particular case.' 62 The court identified
three facts in this case that established the reasonableness of the third party's
belief. The acts in question were a continuation of prior accounting
services,' 63 the prior accounting services gave rise to a trust relationship," 4 and
the agent had done nothing to convey the lack of authority to the third party.'
Although these factors might not always establish that the third party's belief
was reasonable, they did in this case. Again, courts must consider "the facts
in the particular case."' 66
only for acts commonly performed by people with that position. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 27 cmt. a (1957) (describing power of position doctrine and stating, "[T]o those
who know of the appointment there is apparent authority to do the things ordinarily entrusted
to one occupying such a position").
158. See Croisant, 432 P.2d at 801 (noting that accountants did not commonly handle
funds and therefore concluding "that liability cannot be rested upon a manifestation [whether
to the agent or to the third party] by defendants that they assented to be bound for such services").

159. See id. (identifying no manifestation other than agent's position).
160. See id. (citing definition of inherent agency in Second Restatement and stating that
agent may bind principal even without actual or apparent authority because "[a]n agent may
have an 'inherent agency power"').
161. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (providing requisite elements of inherent
agency).
162. See Croisant v.Watrud, 432 P.2d 799, 803 (Or. 1967) (noting that courts did not test
reasonableness of third party's belief of authority by accountants' description of what their
authority included because third party was not accountant).
163. See id. (describing past services of which services in question were continuation).
The court noted that the agent was taking on additional responsibilities "as a continuation of the
original employment of the partnership firm." Id.
164. See id. at 804 (identifying trust relationship that past transactions developed between
third party and agent). The court stated that assumption of reasonableness "is even more
likely.., where there istrust and confidence reposed in the person employed." Id.
165. See id. (noting that agent had done nothing to inform third party that he was no longer
acting on behalf of principal partnership).
166. Id. at 803. The three elements that the court identified (the continuity of services, the
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The court correctly found inherent agency power based on the third
party's reasonable belief. Nonetheless, the court inappropriately cited Section
161 of the Second Restatement as defining the scope of inherent agency. 67

Section 161 does provide one example of inherent agency"6s and shows that
inherent agency is distinct from apparent authority. 69 Nonetheless, Section
161 applies inherent agency only when the transactions in question usually
accompany the agent's authorized transactions.'
Because the court applied
inherent agency even though the acts in question did not usually accompany
Watrud's position, Section 161 must not truly define the full scope of inherent
agency. 7 ' Instead of using Section 161 as the full scope of inherent agency,
trust relationship, and a failure to convey lack of authority) probably would not suffice in all
cases. If Watrud had claimed to have authority to watch the dogs of the firm's clients, a third
party's belief that he had such authority from the firm probably would have been unreasonable,
even if such services were a continuation of a trust relationship and Watrud failed to convey
lack of authority. Similarly, if the third party discovered a lack of Watrud's authority from
another source, any further belief of authority would have been unreasonable, despite a
continuation of a trust relationship or the agent's failure to convey lack of authority. Cf infra
notes 184, 189 (discussing two cases and quoting courts' reasoning that indicated the inapplicability of inherent agency once third party knows that agent lacks authority because any belief
to contrary is then unreasonable).
167. See id. at 801 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 161 (1957)). Section
161 reads as follows:
A general agent for a disclosed . . . principal subjects his principal to liability for
acts done.., which usually accompany or are incidental to transactions which the
agent is authorized to conduct if, although they are forbidden by the principal, the
other party reasonably believes that the agent is authorized to do them and has no
notice that he is not so authorized.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 161 (1957).
168. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 161 cmt. a (1957) (noting that agent in
example has neither actual authority nor apparent authority but nonetheless subjects principal
to liability based on inherent agency).
169. See id. cmt. b (identifying distinction between inherent agency and apparent authority). Like the Croisant case and the cases that follow, this comment illustrates a situation in
which inherent agency applies despite the lack of apparent authority. Although the example
closely resembles the power of position doctrine, this example lacks the manifestation that
apparent authority requires - namely, the appointment of the agent to a position. Because the
agent is merely a general agent rather than one with a certain position of power, no manifestation to the third party is present, so apparent authority is inapplicable. Again, the cases that
follow provide other examples in which inherent agency imposes liability on the principal
despite the inapplicability of apparent authority.
170. See id. § 161 (providing, "A general agent... subjects his principal to liability for
acts done on his account which usually accompany [authorized] transactions") (emphasis
added).
171.
See Croisant v. Watrud, 432 P.2d 799, 802 (Or. 1967) (noting that authority to handle
funds did not "usually accompany" and was not "incidental to" Watrud's authorized responsibil-
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the court used a standard
ofthe third party's reasonableness to define the scope
72
of inherent agency.
2. Modern Examples over the Last Decade
Since Croisant,an impressive number of courts have accepted inherent
agency as a distinct doctrine and have used that doctrine as a basis for their
decisions.'73 The following cases serve as a sample ofhow courts over the last
decade have accepted and applied inherent agency and correctly distinguished
inherent agency from apparent authority." 4 Following this sample of correct
treatment of inherent agency, the Note will examine two groups of cases in
which courts treated inherent agency incorrectly, either by incorrectly failing
76
to apply inherent agency' 5 or by applying inherent agency incorrectly.
In Kahn v. Royal Banks ofMissouri,'" a husband had signed both his and
his wife's names to two notes payable to a bank and secured with jointly
owned property as collateral.' When the bank declared the notes in default
and sought to sell the collateral, the wife filed a declaratory judgment action
against both the bank and her husband. 7 9 A central issue in the case was
whether the husband's actions bound the wife as a principal.'80
ities, but nonetheless holding principal accounting firm liable because third party was reasonable in thinking that there was such usual accompaniment).
172. See id. at 803 (basing liability of partnership on reasonableness of third party). The
court made the following important observation:
If a third person reasonably believes that the services he has requested of a member
of an accounting partnership is [sic] undertaken as a part of the partnership business, the partnership should be bound for a breach of trust incident to that employment even though those engaged in the practice of accountancy would regard as
unusual the performance of such service by an accounting firm.
Id.
173. See infra note 269-71 (citing cases in which courts have recognized inherent agency
as distinct category).
174. See infra Part IVA2 (analyzing five recent cases that correctly distinguished inherent
agency from other agency principles and showing that court used inherent agency as basis for
its decision in four of these cases).
175. See infra Part IV.B (discussing one case pending in federal district court that improperly failed to apply inherent agency).
176. See infra Part IV.C (analyzing three cases in which court applied inherent agency
improperly).
177. 790 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
178. Kahn v. Royal Banks of Mo., 790 S.W.2d 503,506 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
179. Id.
180. See id. at 508-09 (determining whether agent husband, in spite of his breach of
fiduciary duty, nonetheless had apparent authority or inherent agency power to bind principal
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The court correctly found no actual authority because the husband, as his
wife's agent, had breached his fiduciary duty by signing his wife's name for
his own benefit."' The court then based its decision on both apparent
authority and inherent agency. If the bank's belief that the husband had
authority arose from the power of attorney agreement that the wife had signed,
then the husband had apparent authority arising from a manifestation by the
wife to the bank." 2 This apparent authority would remain until the wife
communicated a lack thereof to the bank."' In the alternative, if the bank's
belief that the husband had authority arose not from the principal wife's
manifestations but instead from the agent husband's own statements, then the
court would still bind the wife based on inherent agency.18 4 Hence, the court
correctly distinguished inherent agency and used that doctrine as one of two
bases for its decision.
Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc." 5 is a challenging case to analyze because
it dealt with a special agent rather than a general agent."8 6 An attorney, acting
without actual authority, entered a settlement agreement on behalf of his two
clients. 8 7 The federal district court certified to the state court the question of
whether such a settlement would bind the clients. 8 The state court concluded
wife).
181. See id. at 507-08 ("[Wlhen an agent is authorized to borrow money on his principal's
behalf, it is inferred that the agent is authorized to borrow only for the purposes of the
principal ....
Obviously, then, an agent has no actual authority to act in violation of his
fiduciary duties.") (quotation and citation omitted).
182. See id. at 508 ("As long as-the husband had not breached his fiduciary duties prior
to apprising the Bank of the durable power of attorney, the husband retained apparent
authority.., until [the wife] communicated revocation of the power of attorney to the Bank.")
(emphasis added).
183. See id. ("[T]he wife concedes that she did not communicate revocation of the durable
power of attorney to the Bank until after the 1987 transactions.").
184. See id. at 509 (showing that principal wife was liable for agent husband's conduct
even if he breached his authority, as long as bank had no knowledge of breach and therefore was
in good faith). The court explained the liability as follows:
Since the Bank had no knowledge that the husband may have been acting in
violation of his fiduciary duties and therefore beyond his authority, the husband had
inherent agency power to deal with the Bank on his wife's behalf. Even if the
husband did breach his fiduciary duties as his wife's agent, she, as principal, would
still be liable to the Bank, a third party dealing in good faith with her ostensible
agent.
Id.
185. 693 N.E.2d 1299 (Ind. 1998).
186. Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1305 (Ind. 1998).
187. Id. at 1301.
188. Id.
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that the district court should bind the clients based on the attorney's inherent
agency power,"8 9 despite his lack of apparent authority. 19 The court correctly
chose not to apply apparent authority's power of position doctrine for two
reasons. First, that doctrine considers only the agent's position, whereas this

court considered factors other than the position in determining the binding

effect of the settlement agreement. 9 ' Second, the attorney's position was not
of the type to which the power of position doctrine usually applies." 9 The

court instead correctly bound the client by the attorney's inherent agency
power in order to provide "the protection of third parties who rely on the
finality of [the settlement] procedures."' 93
Menard, Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc.'9 4 is another case in which the court
correctly found inherent agency power rather than actual or apparent authority.
Arthur Sterling served as a director and president for defendant Dage-MTI,
Inc.' 95 Plaintiff Menard, Inc. sought to purchase a tract of land that Dage
owned." Dage's directors authorized Sterling to solicit Menard's offers but
gave him no authority to accept any offer from Menard on behalf of Dage. 1"

Overreaching his authority, Sterling did accept an offer from Menard, and the
contract of sale that Sterling signed falsely stated that he had authority to do

189. See id. ("[R]ctention does equip an attorney with the inherent power to bind a client
to the results of a procedure in court .... Accordingly, in the absence of a communication of
lack of authority by the attorney, as a matter of law, an attorney has the inherent power to settle
a claim .... ).
190. See id. ("[W]e conclude that the sole act of retaining an attorney does not give the
attorney the implied or the apparent authority to settle [a claim], nor is it a manifestation by the
client to third parties such that the attorney is clothed with the apparent authority to settle.").
191. See id. (noting that binding effect of settlement depends not only on attorney's
position but also on "the conduct of the client, either with respect to the third parties who deal
with the attorney or with respect to the attorney[, as well as on] the nature of the proceedings").
192. See id. at 1305 (noting that attorneys are special, not general, agents). The power of
position doctrine usually applies to employees who serve as general agents in a position of
recognized title. An attorney is not an employee of the client, has no special title, and does not
serve over a continued period of time as does a general agent.
193. Id.
194. 726 N.E.2d 1206 (Ind. 2000).
195. Menard, Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1206, 1208 (Ind. 2000).
196. Id. at 1209.
197. See id. (describing Sterling's authority). Sterling had presented a resolution to Dage's
board of directors that would have authorized him to offer and sell the tract in question. Id.
However, the other directors instructed Sterling to change the resolution to allow him to offer
the tract but not to sell it. Id. They also told Sterling that he could not negotiate the terms of
sale, and two directors on separate occasions specifically reminded him that any offer needed
board review and approval. Id.
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No one at Dage told Menard that Dage's board had limited Sterling's

authority to the solicitation of offers. 1 When Dage sought to back out of the
deal, Menard brought a suit for specific performance. 2"
Although the court briefly mentioned actual and apparent authority, it
failed to state why it found those two doctrines inapplicable.'O° Instead, it
abruptly stated, "We find the concept of inherent authority rather than actual

or apparent authority controls our analysis in this case."2 Nonetheless, the
court correctly applied inherent agency rather than actual or apparent
authority, even if its reasoning was incorrect. No actual authority existed
because Dage specifically instructed Sterling not to close the deal on its
behalf.2" 3 Apparent authority was inapplicable because the plaintiff's belief
arose not from the principal's manifestation in appointing Sterling as
president, but rather from statements that Sterling himself made." The court
used a three-part analysis to apply inherent agency. First, Sterling's actions in
question were ones that "usually accompany or are incidental to transactions
which [he was] authorized to conduct."205 Next, Menard's belief that Sterling
was authorized to bind Dage in contract was reasonable.2 ' Finally, Menard's
198. See id. at 1210 (noting that Sterling, unbeknownst to Dage's board of directors, both
negotiated changes in Menard's offer and signed offer on behalf of Dage). The offer that
Sterling signed stated, "The persons signing this Agreement on behalf of the Seller [Dage] are
duly authorized to do so and their signatures bind the seller.... " Id.
199. Id.
200. See id. (observing that Dage's board tried to have Sterling remove Dage from deal,
after which time Menard filed specific performance action). The lower courts ruled in favor of
Dage, finding that Sterling had neither express actual authority nor apparent authority to bind
Dage. See id. (citing Menard, Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc., 698 N.E.2d 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)).
201.
See id. at 1210-11 (providing definitions for actual and apparent authority but never
showing how they were inapplicable to this case).
202.
Id. at 1212.
203. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing Sterling's lack of actual
authority to close deal).
204. See Menard, Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1206, 1215 (Ind.2000) ("We find
it reasonable that Menard did not question the corporate president's statement that he had
'authority from his Board of Directors to proceed' with the land transaction."); infra note 206
and accompanying text (noting that plaintiff's reasonableness arose from Sterling's own
statements, not principal's appointment of him to his position).
205.
Id. at 1214 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 161 (1957)). Again, as
noted above, Section 161 provides only examples of inherent agency, and therefore a situation
need not fall under that section for inherent agency to apply. See supra notes 167-72 and
accompanying text (discussing Croisant and showing that Section 161 is not exhaustive but
instead merely provides some examples of inherent agency).
206. See id.("Here, the facts establish that Menard reasonably believed that Sterling was
authorized to contract for the sale and purchase of Dage real estate."). Although the court noted
Sterling's position as part of what made Menard's belief reasonable, more importantly the court

1614

59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1585 (2002)

belief would have been unreasonable if it knew that Sterling lacked authority,
but Menard had no such knowledge." 9 Because Menard's belief that Sterling
had authority to close the deal was reasonable and was not based on his
position, the court correctly applied inherent agency rather than apparent
authority.
The court used certain language that could cause confusion about
apparent authority. Specifically, the court noted that Menard was not dealing

with a lower-tiered employee, special agent, or general agent, but instead was
dealing with Dage's president, and therefore inherent agency was more
appropriate than apparent authority."' If the court meant to suggest that
involvement of a president precludes application of apparent authority, the
court was wrong. 0 9 Nonetheless, for the reasons stated above, apparent
authority0 was inapplicable in this case, and the court correctly chose inherent
21
agency.

Federal courts also have distinguished correctly between apparent
authority and inherent agency power. In Cange v. Stotler & Co. ,211 the plaintiff
invested money with the defendant futures commission merchant. 2 The
plaintiff argued that the defendant was liable for unauthorized trades made by
the defendant's agents. 213 The court correctly reversed the lower court's
dismissal ofthe case.21 4 Dismissal was improper because the lower court could
have imposed liability' on the defendant for using agents but failing to inform

showed that Sterling himself (not the principal) "confirmed that he had the authority from his
Board of Directors to proceed." Id. at 1214-15.
207. See id.at 1216 ("We conclude that Menard had no notice that the Board had limited
Sterling's authority with respect to [the] 30-acre parcel.").
208. See id. at 1212 (applying inherent agency, not apparent authority, because Sterling
was president rather than lower-tiered employee, suggesting that court believed that involvement of president precludes applicability of apparent authority).
209. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing power of position doctrine
as one type of apparent authority).
210. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text (showing why apparent authority was
inapplicable and that inherent agency was better choice).
211.
826 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1987).
212.
Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d 581,583 (7th Cir. 1987).
213. Id.
214. See id. at 595 ("The scope of Wilson's actual and inherent authority are issues of fact
and cannot be resolved based on the present limited record. The district court should not have
granted defendant's summary judgment motion .... ."). The court remanded this case to the
lower court to give it the opportunity to rule in the plaintiff's favor. After the lower court took
that opportunity, the appellate court affirmed, entitling the plaintiff to all unrecovered losses,
costs, and attorneys' fees. Cange v. Stotler & Co., No. 85 C 7664, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13862 (N.D. Il1. June 20, 1988), afld, 913 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1990).
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third parties of the limits on the agents' authority. 2 "' Because such agents
customarily had the authority in question, the plaintiffs might have been

reasonable.in assuming that the defendant had given authority to the agents.216
The court provided no apparent authority analysis, but it likely would have
found no apparent authority because the principal had made no manifestations
party, whether expressly or by placing the agents in positions of
to the third
21 7
power.
The majority in FirstFidelity Bank, N.A. v. Government ofAntigua &
Barbuda - PermanentMission215 correctly chose not to follow the dissent's
argument in favor of applying inherent agency. A plaintiff bank sought to hold
Antigua liable for a loan that its agent ambassador to the United States had
entered and defaulted. 219 The court reversed a lower court's grant of default
judgment in favor of the plaintiff third party bank. 2 Citing the power of
position doctrine, the court noted that an ambassador might have had apparent
authority to bind the principal state in contract, 22' but here the plaintiff third

215. See Cange, 826 F.2d at 590 (showing that principal was liable for acts that third party
reasonably believed were within agent's authority, despite principal's limiting instructions to
contrary, as long as third party did not know of instructions). The court elaborated on the point
as follows:
Stotler and Company allowed Wilson to act as its agent in handling plaintiff's
account, and absent proof that Stotler and Company informed plaintiff that Wilson
would not have the customary power of a person in a similar agency relationship,
the defendant is bound by the acts of its agent no matter its secret limitations to the
contrary.
Id. Of course, if the defendant had told the plaintiff that it excluded the acts in question from
the agent's authority, then it no longer would have been reasonable for the plaintiff to assume
that the agent had authority, in which case no liability based on inherent agency would have
existed.
216. See id. at 591 (stating that trier of fact could have found that such agents customarily
had type of authority in question and therefore that "the plaintiff's reliance on those statements
and' promises.., could be found to be reasonable").
217. The court determined that the plaintiff was reasonable because agents under these
circumstances usually had such authority. However, the mere fact that an agent under similar
circumstances would usually have the authority in question does not mean that the agent holds
a position of power, such as the position of CEO or general manager. Because the agent in this
case held no position with a title of power, the power of position doctrine was inapplicable,
even if agents in similar circumstances usually had the authority in question.
877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989).
218.
219. First Fid. Bank, NA. v. Oov't of Ant. & Barb. - Permanent Mission, 877 F.2d 189,
191 (2d Cir. 1989).
220. Id. at 196.
221. See id. at 193-94 (citing power of position doctrine and noting that agency principles
considered agent's position as ambassador in determining extent of apparent authority).
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party's beliefinthe agent's authority might have been unreasonable. 2" In such
a case, default judgment in the third party's favor was improper.
The dissent argued that the majority's refusal to use inherent agency to
bind the principal state would make third parties hesitant to lend money to
agent ambassadors.223 Because such hesitancy would hurt foreign relations,
the dissent would have applied inherent agency.224 However, the dissent's
legal analysis focused on the power of position doctrine. That is, the dissent
noted that the agent's position as ambassador was what manifested to the third
party that the principal state guaranteed the loan.22 Because the dissent based
its reasoning on the agent's position as ambassador rather than the third party's
reasonableness, the majority correctly rejected the argument and instead
analyzed the case under apparent authority.
B. Case Law IncorrectlyFailingto Use Inherent Agency
"Courts rarely use the term inherent agency power. Rather, they
improperly use apparent authority theory to analyze fact situations that should
have been considered under an inherent agency power theory.,,226 The
following case currently pending in a federal district court in Pennsylvania
serves as a good example of courts incorrectly choosing apparent authority
over inherent agency.
In Farrisv. J. C. Penney Co.,227 plaintiffs husband and wife brought a
personal injury action against a defendant retail store for injuries that the wife
sustained when she fell on the defendant's premises. 22 After one day at trial,
the attorneys for both sides informed the judge that the parties had settled the
matter. 229 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs would not comply with their
attorney's enforcement of the settlement agreement. 2 ° The plaintiffs argued
222.

See id. at 195 (providing evidence "which raises questions about the reasonableness

of First Fidelity's reliance upon their apparent authority").
223. Id. at 199 (Newman, J., dissenting).
224. See id. at 198 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that govemment-ambassador
relationship was "especially suitable" for application of inherent agency doctrine).
225. See id. at 199 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that ambassador's position was basis
that court should have used to impose liability upon principal state). "An ambassador may not
be 'l'etat' [the state] for all purposes, but in the context of purporting to obtain goods and
services for his country's diplomatic mission, I believe 'c'est lui' [it is him] indeed." Id.
(Newman, J., dissenting).
226. Colton, supra note 7, at 443.
227. 2 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Pa. 1998), rev'd, 176 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1999).
228. Farris v. J.C. Penney Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 695, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1998), rev'd, 176 F.3d
706 (3d Cir. 1999).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 696-97.
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that their attorney had no authority to enter a settlement agreement with the
defendant." The court correctly agreed with the plaintiffs that the attorney
had no actual authority.232 The plaintiffs argued that precedent required an
attorney to have express actual authority before she could settle a case. 3 The
court disagreed with that argument and stated that implied actual authority or
apparent authority would also suffice to enforce settlement agreements in
some circumstances.2 34 Although the court correctly found no implied actual
authority,2 5 it did find apparent authority.236 The court tried to base its
finding of apparent authority on manifestations by the plaintiff principals to
the defendant third party, but in actuality no such manifestations occurred; all
the manifestations that the court cited were from the plaintiff principals to
their own agent attorney.2 37 The plaintiffs' only manifestation to the third
party was the appointment of the attorney to his position. Because the court
did not even discuss that manifestation, the court's justification for finding
apparent authority was insufficient.
Therefore, the appellate court should have reversed the decision or
affirmed it on different grounds (such as inherent agency). The appellate court
spent several pages discussing how Pennsylvania law treated an attorney's
apparent authority to settle a case. 23 Within this analysis, the court did agree

with the trial court that apparent authority alone sometimes may be sufficient
to settle cases.239 However, the court concluded its analysis by stating that
231. Id.
at 699.
232. Id.
233. See id.("Plaintiffs argue [citing precedent] that express authority is the only basis
upon which to uphold a settlement under Pennsylvania law.... .") (citation omitted).
234. See id.
("[One precedent] stated that 'the law in [Pennsylvania] is quite clear that an
attorney must have express authority to settle a cause of action for the client', but then went on
to conclude that 'the Pennsylvania Supreme Court might allow implied actual authority or
apparent authority to suffice' under the appropriate set of facts.") (citations omitted).
235. See id.
at 699 n.7 (noting that implied actual authority, as part of actual authority,
required manifestations by principal to agent and observing that no such manifestations
occurred here in regard to settlement).
236. See id. at 699 (noting that this case "presents the appropriate set of facts for a finding
ofapparent authority").
237. See id. at 700 (citing certain manifestations that court mistakenly believed gave rise
to apparent authority, such as plaintiffs and agent attorney entering chambers, agent attorney
entering witness room, and plaintiffs sitting with agent attorney). These were not manifestations
by the principals to the third party. Indeed, the second manifestation (the attorney entering the
witness room) was not a manifestation by the principals at all.
238. See Farris v. JC Penney Co., 176 F.3d 706, 709-13 (3d Cir. 1999) (analyzing prior
Pennsylvania cases that discussed sufficiency of attorney's apparent authority to settle cases).
Of course, this case did not conclude the state issue because it came from a federal court.
239. See id.
at 711 ("While we reiterate... that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania may
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those circumstances existed only when the manifestations giving rise to the
apparent authority were statements directly from the principal to the third party
that the attorney had such authority.2" Because such manifestations were not
present here, the trial court should not have concluded that the attorney had
apparent authority to settle the case.241
The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court, thereby giving the
trial court the opportunity to enforce the settlement on different grounds.242

The trial court might use the attorney-client interaction upon which it originally
based apparent authority to find that the third parties acted reasonably for
inherent agency purposes. The trial court likely will take that opportunity
because it hinted during the original trial that inherent agency, rather than the
apparent authority that it found, might have been a better choice.243 Thus,

another case probably soon will correctly distinguish inherent agency from
apparent authority. Again, many cases incorrectly have failed to apply inherent
agency, 2' but this one is of particular importance because it currently is

pending before the federal district court. Elimination of inherent agency from
the Restatement could harm these plaintiffs irreparably.

recognize apparent authority in some case, it has yet to do so and we are not convinced that the
Supreme Court would invoke the doctrine on the facts ofthis case.").
240. See id. at 712 ("[Imn order for the doctrine of apparent authority to apply, the facts
must show that the plaintiffs (principals) communicated directly with defense counsel [third
party], making representations that would lead defense counsel to believe that the plaintiffs'
attorney had authority to settle the case.").
241.
See id. (identifying manifestations that trial court cited, explaining their insufficiency
to give rise to apparent authority as this court interpreted it, and concluding that "[w]e aie
convinced that. .. the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would not rely on the doctrine of
apparent authority to enforce the settlement").
242. See id. at 713 (remanding case to district court for further proceedings).
243. See Farris v. J.C. Penney Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 695,700 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (noting that
apparent authority was basis for decision to impose liability, but stating that inherent agency
could have been alternative, perhaps better reasoning for same decision), rev'd, 176 F.3d 706
(3d Cir. 1999). The court stated:
A more rational approach might be to adopt "inherent agency doctrine" as an
alternate basis to uphold a settlement in cases where express authority is lacking,
and the principal has made no manifestations of authorization to the third party, but
the attorney has taken various steps indicating that he has authority to settle ....
Such a doctrine... removes the burden from the third party to produce affirmative
evidence of actual or apparent authority, and places the dispute where it should be,
between the principal and his or her agent.
Id.
244. See Colton, supra note 7, at 461-62 (citing American Society of MechanicalEngineers,Inc. v. HydrolevelCorp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) as one example in which Court improperly
based its decision on apparent authority rather than inherent agency).
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C. Case Law IncorrectlyApplying InherentAgency
This section does not deal with a correct distinction between actual or
apparent authority and inherent agency but rather with the incorrect
application of inherent agency by some courts. In Trust Co. of Georgia v.
Nationwide Moving & Storage Co.,245 the court incorrectly applied inherent
agency. A general manager of the plaintiff corporation opened an account at
the defendant bank, upon which he was the only individual authorized to make
transactions.2" When the corporation discovered the account, it sued the
defendant bank for the monies that the bank held to which the corporation had

entitlement.24 Clearly no actual authority existed because the corporation had
not manifested to the agent his authority to open that account. 4 ' However, the
court cursorily - and erroneously - dismissed the apparent authority doctrine
by stating that the corporation had made no manifestations to the third party
bank.249 Although manifestations between the principal and the third party are
the focus of apparent authority, in this case the court failed to identify one
such manifestation. Rather, the court dealt with the manifestation of
appointing the agent as general manager under inherent agency.25 ° Although
the court found that an agent's appointment as general manager alone is
insufficient to make the third party's belief of authority reasonable,251 that
appointment was a public manifestation that the court should have analyzed
under apparent authority, not inherent agency.2" 2 By failing to consider the
appointment as a manifestation by the principal, and instead analyzing the
appointment under inherent agency, the court entirely misapplied inherent
agency.
Another incorrect application of inherent agency comes from an
intermediate appellate court in Georgia. In Family PartnersWorldwide, Inc.

245. 219 S.E.2d 162 (Ga. 1975).
246. Trust Co. of Ga. v. Nationwide Moving & Storage Co., 219 S.E.2d 162, 163-64 (Ga.
1975).
247. Id. at 164.
248. See id.at 165 (noting that plaintiff did not even allege that actual authority existed).
249. See id.
(claiming that "[tlhere were no manifestations of authority to this bank by the
principal, so apparent authority is not in issue").
250. See id. (discussing agent's position under inherent agency power).
251.
See id.
(stating that bank had no right to rely "solely on the general manager's position
as general manager for the power to set up a corporate bank account").
252. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AMENCY § 27 cmt. a (1957) ("[A]pparent authority
can be created by appointing a person to a position, such as that of manager..., which carries
with it generally recognized duties.... ."); supranotes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing
power of position doctrine as being within apparent authority).
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v. SunTrust Bank,253 the plaintiff corporation appealed a grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendant bank.254 The corporation sued the bank to
recover monies that the corporation's agent CEO extorted. 2" In this case, the
court affirmed the summary judgment because the CEO, accordingto the court,
had inherent agency power to bind the corporation. 56 However, the court's
reasoning perfectly mirrored what should have been an apparent authority
analysis. Specifically, the court stated that the bank was reasonable in
assuming that the CEO had authority merely because of his position. 7
Although the result based on apparent authority would have been the same as
based on inherent agency, analysis based on apparent authority would have
been more appropriate.
In both Family Partnersand Trust Co., the court should have based its
decision on apparent authority's power of position doctrine, whereas the

Menardcourt correctly based its decision on inherent agency. The difference
is subtle yet determinative. In FamilyPartnersand Trust Co., the third party's

actual belief arose from the appointment of the agent to his position. 2 51 That
appointment was a manifestation by the principal to the third party.2" 9 In the
Menard case, on the other hand, the actual belief arose from the agent's own
communications to the third party,2"° not from any manifestation by the
principal (whether in word or in appointment of the agent to his position). 6 '
253. 530 S.E.2d 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
254. Family Partners Worldwide, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, 530 S.E.2d 742, 743 (Oa. Ct.
App. 2000).
255.
Id.
256. See id. at 744 ("The undisputed evidence showed that McOrew had the inherent
In this evidentiary
agency power to open the accounts and withdraw deposited funds ....
posture, the trial court correctly granted SunTrust's motion for summary judgment.").
257. See id. at 743 (finding reasonableness of third party's belief for inherent agency
purposes based on appointment of agent to his position). The misuse of inherent agency power
in this case was even more blatant than the misuse in Trust Co. This court's reasoning proceeded as follows: "The question [is) whether McGrew had inherent agency power .... Did
SunTrust have the right to rely solely on McOrew's position as CEO for the power to set up a
corporate bank account... ? We hold it did." Id. The court clearly stated that the third party
based its belief on the agent's position, so the court should have applied the power of position
doctrine, a type of apparent authority.
258. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text (explaining why court in Trust Co.
should have based its decision on power of position doctrine); supra note 257 and accompanying text (showing that belief of third party in Family Partnersarose from appointment of agent
to his position).
259. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing power of position doctrine
as one application of apparent authority).
260. See supra note 206 (showing that belief of third party in Menard arose from agent's
communications, not agent's position).
See SEAVEY, supra note 26, at 17 (describing Judge Hand's distinction between
261.
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Another incorrect application of the inherent agency doctrine appears in
Sheriff Electric Service v. Greater Allen AME Church.262 The plaintiff
subcontractor performed work outside of the scope of a contract in order to
satisfy the request of the agent pastor of the defendant church.2 63 After the
principal church did not pay the subcontractor for his services, the
subcontractor brought an action seeking to hold the church liable for the
pastor's request.2 The appellate court reversed the trial court's finding of
inherent agency power.265 The appellate court's inherent agency analysis was
brief and wholly incorrect.2" The court merely concluded that the pastor did
not follow the proper procedures to request additional services from a
subcontractor, and therefore he had no inherent agency power.267 However, the
focus of inherent agency is upon the third party and its belief, not upon the
agent's actions.'
The court should have found that the third party acted
reasonably in actually believing that the pastor had authority to request

additional services.
V RetainingInherent Agency as a DistinctCategory
A. Elimination of InherentAgency ContradictsPrecedent
The previous Part of this Note analyzes cases in which the courts
distinguished apparent authority from inherent agency. Professor Steven
Fishman has identified over two dozen cases in which courts at least

apparent authority and inherent agency and noting that he "carefully explained that apparent
authority... was at least somewhat misleading in cases in which the party dealing with the
agent did not rely upon more than the agent's statement"). So, Professor Seavey demonstrates
that no apparent authority exists when the third party relies only on the agent's statements; only
inherent agency applies. On the other hand, if the third party relies on something in addition
to or other than such statements (such as reliance upon the agent's position), then apparent
authority might apply.
262. No. 7628, 1982 Ohio App. LEXIS 13685 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1982).
263.
Sheriff Elec. Sere. v. Greater Allen AME Church, No. 7628, 1982 Ohio App. LEXIS
13685, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1982).
264. Id.
265. See id. at *5 ("[Tjhe Court [here] rejects the trial court's holding that appellant is
liable under inherent agency power.").
266. See id. at *4-5 (providing court's application of inherent agency).
267. See id. at *4 (noting that pastor did not seek approval from four groups prior to
ordering additional services).
268. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (noting that inherent agency looks at third
party's belief). Although the court perhaps was correct that the pastor inappropriately failed to
receive approval from the four groups, the third party might not have known of the requirement
to seek approval, and therefore its belief may have been reasonable despite the pastor's failure.
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recognized inherent agency as a distinct doctrine, 269 and courts in several more
In over a dozen cases,
cases have done so since publication of his article.

courts not only have identified inherent agency as a distinct doctrine, but also
have used that doctrine correctly as the basis for their decisions .271 Because
269. See Fishman, supra note 6, at 25-26, nn.121-22 (providing extensive list of federal
and state cases in which courts recognized inherent agency and distinguished it from apparent
authority).
270. See Pohl v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 2000) (identifying
inherent agency as one means by which attorney could bind client to settlement); Staten v. Neal,
880 F.2d 962,965-66 (7th Cir. 1989) (incorrectly using Section 161 as scope of inherent agency
and therefore concluding that attorney had no inherent authority to enter plea agreement because
position of attorney usually did not include such authority); First Fid. Bank, NA. v. Gov't of
Ant. & Barb. - Permanent Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 198-99 (2d Cir. 1989) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (arguing incorrectly that inherent agency should hold government liable for agent
ambassador's default on loan); United States v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 512, 51415 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (concluding that inherent agency was inapplicable because third party's
belief was unreasonable); Fields v. Horizon House, Inc., Civil Action No. 86-4343, 1987 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11315, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 1987) (same); Browne v. Maxfield, 663 F. Supp.
1193, 1200 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (identifying inherent agency doctrine but concluding that
general respondeat superior principles were more applicable); Rouse Woodstock, Inc. v. Sur.
Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 630 F. Supp. 1004, 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (citing Sections 165 and
166 of Second Restatement and concluding that president had inherent authority to bind
corporation whereas vice-president did not); Evanston Bank v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc.,
623 F. Supp. 1014, 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (citing Section 8 A of Second Restatement and
applying Illinois law to conclude that inherent authority of corporate president fell under "the
umbrella label of apparent authority"); Cmty. Collaborative v. Ganim, 698 A.2d 245, 252
(Conn. 1997) (stating that presidents did not have inherent authority to bind corporation per se
pursuant to Connecticut law); Family Partners Worldwide, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, 530 S.E.2d
742, 744 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding incorrectly that CEO had inherent agency power to bind
corporation); Gallant Ins. Co. v. Davis, 751 N.E.2d 672,675-76 (Ind. 2001) (holding that lower
court improperly based decision on inherent agency rather than apparent authority because agent
was not president and therefore had no inherent authority); Grosberg v. Mich. Nat'l BankOakland, 362 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Mich. 1985) (incorporating inherent agency into implied
authority).
See Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d 581, 590-91 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that
271.
lower court could have used inherent agency to hold commodity futures merchant liable for
agents' unauthorized transactions and that dismissal was therefore improper); Ortiz v. DuffNorton Co., 975 F. Supp. 713, 719 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (concluding that insurance company for
employer had inherent agency power to bind company in settlement of products liability suit);
Dupuis v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 879 F. Supp. 139, 144 (D. Me. 1995) (holding
undisclosed defendant corporation liable on inherent agency grounds); Xylas v. Tollway
Arlington Nat'l Bank, No. 84 C 6149, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5623, at *9-10 (N.D. Ill. June 17,
1987) (concluding that summary judgment in principal's favor was improper because inherent
agency might have applied to hold principal bank liable, even if apparent authority was
inapplicable, as long as third party's belief was reasonable); Bigane Vessel Fueling Co. v.
Bolton Steam Shipping Co., No. 79 C 2041, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9949, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 15, 1981) (applying inherent agency to bind principal because of statements that its agent
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so many courts have used inherent agency as the correct basis for their
decisions, any elimination of inherent agency that changes the results of these
cases is inconsistent with the respect for precedent in our legal system.272
Any claim that the draft of the Third Restatement respects precedent
because it would not change the results in these cases arguably has serious
flaws."7 The only two expansions of the definition of "manifestation" that the
draft alleges are the incorporation of the power of position doctrine and the
allowance of nonverbal manifestations."' The analysis of the above cases
already assumes both of these "expansions" yet still demonstrates opposite
results under inherent agency and apparent authority.' 5 Only in Thurber &
Co. v. Anderson" 6 and Watteau v. Fenwick,2" both involving undisclosed
principals, would analysis under the draft of the Third Restatement yield the

made); Lincoln Bank v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 476 F. Supp. 1118, 1122-23 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (basing
decision to bind principal bank with contract signed by its agent in part on inherent agency);
United States v. Lieber, 473 F. Supp. 884, 892 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (basing liability of United
States in contract on United States Attorney's promise because third party was reasonable, even
though authority of such attorneys was of "limited extent" and usually did not include authority
to bind country); Menard, Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1206, 1212 (Ind. 2000) (holding
that president/director had inherent agency power to bind corporation in sale contract); Koval
v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1301 (Ind. 1998) (holding that attorney, despite lack
of apparent authority, had inherent agency power to bind client in settlement agreement);
Jackson v. Goodman, 244 N.W.2d 423,424-25 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (reversing lower court's
judgment notwithstanding verdict in order to reinstate jury's decision that based principal's
liability on inherent agency and ratification); Kahn v. Royal Banks of Mo., 790 S.W.2d 503,
508-09 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (binding wife by transactions of her husband based on apparent
authority or, as alternative, based on inherent agency from power of attorney contract); Cote
Bros. v. Granite Lake Realty Corp., 193 A.2d 884, 886 (N.H. 1963) (binding corporation
because financial managers had inherent agency power to purchase ordinary supplies, in part
from their position but also because of their statements to third party); Croisant v. Watrud, 431
P.2d 799, 801 (Or. 1967) (holding accounting firm liable for conduct of accountant that
improperly handled third party's funds).
272. See supra Part VA (discussing cases based on inherent agency that would have
resulted differently based on apparent authority).
273. See supra note 80 (quoting claim in draft of Third Restatement that other doctrines
in draft provide alternative bases for inherent agency cases).
274. See supra notes 85, 87 and accompanying text (noting that only "expansions" of
definition of "manifestation" in draft of Third Restatement are power of position doctrine and
allowance of nonverbal communications).
275. See supra notes 33, 40-45 and accompanying text (noting that apparent authority
already includes both nonverbal communications and power of position doctrine); supra Part
IVA (analyzing cases based on inherent agency and finding apparent authority inapplicable
despite these expansions).
276. 88 Ill.
167 (1878).
277. 1 Q.B. 346 (1893).
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same result under estoppel." 8 In the remainder of the cases decided under
inherent agency, the courts either identified no manifestations (even with the
alleged "expansions") or found that something other than manifestations
caused the third party's belief, and therefore correctly concluded that apparent
authority was inapplicable. 9 Like the Second Restatement, the draft requires
both of these elements, so apparent authority would remain inapplicable under
its provisions.280 Furthermore, under the draft of the Third Restatement,
courts no longer could use inherent agency as the basis for their decisions
because the draft eliminates inherent agency."
For example, Croisantv. Watruda2 would have a different outcome under
the draft of the Third Restatement. The court decided that the principal
accounting firm was not liable for the accountant's conduct based on apparent
authority because the principal firm had made no manifestations to the third
party that it had granted him the authority in question. 3 Even under apparent
authority's power of position doctrine, the accountant's position did not
usually include such authority. Thus, appointing Watrud to that position was
not a manifestation sufficient to create apparent authority." 4 Because the draft
of the Third Restatement arguably does not broaden the manifestations that
create apparent authority, no apparent authority would exist under the Third
Restatement draft, and the court would have ruled differently without inherent
agency as a basis for liability." 5
Also, in Kahn v. Royal Banks ofMissoui,2 6 the court concluded that the
agent husband's own statements, rather than any manifestation by the principal
wife, caused the third party's reasonable belief, and therefore the agent had no
278. See supranotes 136, 144 and accompanying text (discussing presence of undisclosed
principals in Thurber and Watteau, respectively).
279. See infra notes 282-98 and accompanying text (showing specifically that Third
Restatement draft would yield different results in inherent agency cases that did not involve
undisclosed principals).
280. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFAGENCY § 3.03 (Tentative Draft No. 2,2001) (requiring "a [principal]'s manifestation" and that "the [third party's] belief is traceable to the manifestation" for creation of apparent authority).
281.
See supra note 80 and accompanying text (identifying elimination of inherent agency
in Third Restatement draft).
282. 432 P.2d 799 (Or. 1967).
283. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text (showing that apparent authority,
other than possibly power of position doctrine, was inapplicable).
284. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (showing that power of position
doctrine was inapplicable).
285. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (suggesting that draft of Third Restatement does not expand definition of "manifestation").
286.
790 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
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apparent authority.2' Likewise, the court inMenard,Inc. v. Dage-MTI,Inc.25"
found apparent authority inapplicable because the agent's statements, rather
than his position, were what gave rise to the third party's belief, even though
the agent in Menarddid hold a position of power to which apparent authority
could have applied."e9 Because the draft of the Third Restatement, like the
Second Restatement, requires the principal's manifestations rather than the
agent's statements to give rise to the third party's belief, apparent authority
would remain inapplicable under the draft. 29 In Koval v. Simon Telelect,
Inc. ,291 the court applied inherent agency rather than apparent authority in order
to protect the third party and because the third party's belief arose from the
conduct of the agent attorney, not his position.2" As with Kahn and Menard,
Koval involved facts to which the Third Restatement draft would not apply
apparent authority because the principal's manifestations were not the cause
ofthe third party's belief.293 Furthermore, the Koval court correctly recognized
that one purpose of inherent agency was the protection of third parties,294
whereas the elimination of inherent agency in the draft of the Third
Restatement necessarily eliminates that purpose.295 In Cange v. Stotler &
Co.,2" the agent did hold a position that gave rise to the third party's
reasonable belief, but that position was not the type to which the power of

287. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (concluding that third party's reasonable
belief may have come from agent husband's statements rather than some manifestation by
principal wife, in which case court based its decision on inherent agency).
288.
726 N.E.2d 1206 (Ind.2000).
289. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (showing that third party based its belief
on agent's statements, not principal's manifestation in appointing agent as president and
director).
290. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (noting that draft of Third Restatement
requires same four elements for apparent authority as Second Restatement, including requirement that third party's belief comes from principal's manifestations).
291.
693 N.E.2d 1299 (Ind. 1998).
292. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text (explaining inapplicability of apparent
authority because power of position doctrine did not apply to attorneys and because third party's
belief arose from- nature of proceedings and showing that court therefore applied inherent
agency to protect third parties).
293. See supra notes 286-90 and accompanying text (noting that apparent authority, under
Third Restatement draft, remains inapplicable to cases in which third party's belief comes from
agent's conduct rather than principal's manifestations).
294. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 A (1957) ("Inherent agency power...
exists for the protection of persons harmed by or dealing with a servant or other agent.").
295.
Cf.supra note 116 (characterizing purpose of inherent agency to protect third parties
as "misleading").
296.
826 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1987).
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position doctrine was applicable.2' Again echoing the Second Restatement,
the draft of the Third Restatement does not apply the power of position
doctrine to all positions, and the agent's position in Cange was one to which

the draft would not apply the doctrine. 2'

B. Eliminationof InherentAgency Is Improperfor a Restatement

Because the proposed elimination of inherent agency in the draft of the
Third Restatement rejects established precedent, that elimination amounts to
a substantive change in the law rather than merely a restatement. Restatements
by their very nature are not supposed to change the law substantively.'" "Mhe
first undertaking of [the ALl] should be to produce a restatement ...
of the law

that would tell judges and lawyers what the law was.'"° Although the ALl has
become more open to some changes in Restatements, those permissible

changes are still few and far between.3°" This Note already has shown that
apparent authority is only one subset of inherent agency.3" Elimination of
inherent agency strikes from the set of inherent agency cases anything that falls

outside of the apparent authority subset. Thus, the elimination of inherent
agency is not a mere restatement but rather a substantive change of the law.303

297. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (finding that apparent authority was
inapplicable because agent's position was not of type to which power of position doctrine
applied).
298. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AoENCY § 3.03 illus. 1, 4-7 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2001) (applying power of position doctrine when agent holds such positions as CEO, university
president, dean, or branch manager). Because the agent in Cange was only a commodities
broker, the power of position doctrine under the draft of the Third Restatement would not
impose liability on the principal commodities firm.
299. See Dormire, supra note 6, at 247 ("The title 'Restatement' suggests that its role is
to reflect the law as it is, possibly with a recasting of the rationale from the opinions reviewed,
but not with a change in result.") (emphasis added).
300. HERBERT F. GOODRICH & PAUL A.WOLKIN, THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN LAW
INsTrrTE 1923-1961, at 8 (1961) (emphasis added).
301.
See AM. LAW INST., THE AMRICAN LAW INSiTTuTE 50THANNIVERsARY 21 (1973)
(saying of Restatements that their "object should not only be to help make certain much that is
now uncertain and to simplify unnecessary complexities, but also to promote those changes
which will tend better to adaptthe laws to the needs oflife") (emphasis added).
302. See supra Part
3.D
(proving that apparent authority is merely subset of inherent
agency).
303. See Fishman, supranote 6, at 17 ("[T]he primary reason for adding [inherent agency]
was to make the courts recognize that inheren t agency power is a separate doctrinal ground for
deciding cases involving unauthorized acts of agents and increase the likelihood that the courts
would utilize the doctrine.").
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Those few changes that the ALl does find appropriate for Restatements
are changes that simplify the law.) ° Therefore, even if the reporter of the

Third Restatement draft proves that the change that she proposes is appropriate
for a Restatement, she still must demonstrate that the change simplifies the law.
This Note argues that the reporter's attempted expansion of apparent authority
to include inherent agency does not promote the ALI's goal of simplicity for
two reasons. First, the reporter uses two steps - elimination of inherent
agency, and expansion of apparent authority - to effectuate her change.3 °5 If

she truly expands apparent authority to cover the full scope of inherent agency,
then she could accomplish the same result with one step: eliminate apparent

authority." 6 The use of one step rather than two would follow the ALI's goal
of promoting simplicity.

Second, the attempt to expand apparent authority to include inherent
agency, rather than simplify the law, creates confusion over apparent

authority. 30 7 The Second Restatement neatly divides actual and apparent
authority on the one hand (which consider manifestations by the principal)
from inherent agency power on the other (which considers the third party's
belief)."re Any attempt to mix the two categories arguably will fail because

"[t]he very nature of the third category of inherent agency power is that it is
different not in degree but in kind."' 309 Indeed, the ALI adopted inherent agency
304. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 301, at 21 (noting that one of "its object[s] should [be]
to simplify unnecessary complexities"); id. at 24 (permitting Restatements to include changes
"in the direction of simplifying the law where it is unnecessarily complex").
305. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (identifying reporter's attempt to expand
apparent authority to include all that inherent agency currently regulates). Again with set
theory, under the Second Restatement, UM = (A nB nC nD) and Uu = (A nB), where UM
and UL represent the universes of cases in which apparent authority and inherent agency,
respectively, apply, and where supra note 67 defines A, B, C, and D. The draft eliminates
inherent agency, or U",leaving only apparent authority, or UM = (A n B n C nD). The draft
then attempts to expand apparent authority to the full scope of inherent agency, leaving UM =
(A o B).
306. That is, after the reporter's elimination of inherent agency and expansion of apparent
authority, all that remains is (A n B), the same result as if the reporter merely eliminated
apparent authority.
307. See Dormire, supra note 6, at 255-56 (citing possibility of expanding apparent
authority to include inherent agency but concluding that this approach would only worsen
situation). Ms. Dormire observes that "[t]he way to fit the inherent agency power concept into
that of apparent authority would be to stretch the word 'manifest.'" Id. at 256. However, she
argues that this approach "will only serve to muddy the now clear concept" of apparent authority. Id. Furthermore, "[a] stretching of the word 'manifest' will not serve to clarify or simplify
the concept[s]." Id.
308. See id.at 256 (identifying line between inherent agency and actual and apparent
authority).
309. Id. Ms. Dormire later reemphasizes her point as follows:
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in the first place to clarify the law."' A mixture of the inherent agency and
apparent authority categories would prevent courts from considering the
purpose of the new combined category in a difficult case because the two
mixed categories have completely different purposes.3 '

C. Policy Arguments Against the Elimination of InherentAgency
Several policy arguments also support the retention of inherent agency.
First, the purpose of the agency relationship is to allow principals to
accomplish more than would be possible without such relationships," 2 in part

because agents and third parties can transact without continuously having to
receive the principal's approval.313 Because principals benefit from these
relationships, the law should require them to take the bitter with the sweet. 1'
Applying that logic, the Second Restatement imposes liability on the principal
when the third party is reasonable, despite the agent's lack ofactual or apparent
Wherever the lines are drawn, inherent agency power still seems distinct from the
other two concepts [of actual and apparent authority,] which are grounded on...
communications by the principal. Thus, it seems analytical clarity would favor
treating inherent agency power separately rather than expanding ... or redefining

apparent authority beyond those bounds.
Id. at 259.
310. See Fishman, supra note 6, at 2 (describing cases that fell outside of more traditional
principles but in which court nonetheless held principal liable and noting that "[t]he doctrine
of inherent agency power was adopted, in part, to serve as an explanation for these cases, and
to provide a doctrinal basis to explain the practice of the courts").
311.
Compare HENN, supra note 27, at 30 (noting that purpose of apparent authority is to
place liability on principal because of its conduct or consent) with id. at 36 (noting that purpose
of inherent agency is to protect third parties).
312. See RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 A cmt. a (1957) ("The principles of
agency have made it possible for persons to utilize the services of others in accomplishing far
more than could be done by their unaided efforts. [Tihe agency relation['s] primary function
in modem life is to make possible the commercial enterprises which could not exist other-

wise.").
313. See EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 12-13 (noting that inherent agency allows agent to
use his best judgment to bind principal rather than having to check back with principal continuously); McKay, supra note 32, at 451 (noting that commercial world must be able to rely on
agents rather than continuously having to confirm their authority).
314. See W. EDWARD SEL, AGENCY § 6 (1975) (noting that "the principal reaps the
benefits of his agent's actions; therefore, it is not unreasonable to hold him liable for his agent's
harmful activities" because that is risk that principal takes when using agents); Fishman, supra
note 6, at 21 ("Both the commentators and the Second Restatement have emphasized the...

unfairness of permitting businesses to obtain benefits from the use of agents without also
bearing the risks when the agents exceed their authority."); McKay, supra note 32, at 451
("[Tlhe employer who creates, controls, and benefits from the agency relationship should stand
to lose, rather than someone who deals in good faith with his agent.").
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authority. 15 Kiddv. Edison316 illustrated the idea. 317 Because the case predated
the Second Restatement, it did not use the phrase "inherent agency," but the
underlying theory was the same.1 Judge Learned Hand recognized that the
principal benefitted from appointing agents because approval of transactions
would no longer occupy all of its time. 3 19 To allow the principal to receive that
benefit, courts must effectuate its wishes in making the agents' transactions
binding, which courts can do only by imposing liability upon the principal,
even if the principal intended otherwise.320 In other words, the court held that
315. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 A cmt. a (1957) (stating that business
entities benefitting from agency relationships should take responsibility for harm by agents to
third parties). That comment reads as follows:
Partnerships and corporations... depend for their existence upon agency principles. The rules designed to promote the interests of these enterprises are necessarily
accompanied by rules to police them. It is inevitable that in doing their work, either
through negligence or excess of zeal, agents will harm third persons or will deal
with them in unauthorized ways. It would be unfairfor an enterprise to have the
benefit of the work of its agents without making it responsible to some extent for
their excesses andfailures to act carefully.
Id. (emphasis added).
316. 239 F. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
317. Kidd v. Edison, 239 F. 405, 406-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). In Kidd, the district court
considered the binding power of an agreement between the plaintiff third party and an agent of
the defendant. The agent had recruited singers for the defendant in the past for musical recitals,
and in this case he recruited a singer for an advertising recital. Id. at 406. The court said that
determining the binding power of the agreement required the court to consider not just the
words from the principal to the agent but rather the "whole setting in which those words are
used." Id. Here, the third parties were reasonable in assuming that the agent's authority
extended to include this type of contract (even though in actuality it did not), and therefore the
court held the defendant liable. Id. at 406, 408. Because the court considered facts other than
the principal's manifestations, the reasoning reflected principles of inherent agency more than
those of apparent authority.
318. See Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d 581, 590-91 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that Judge
Hand's holding in Kidd articulated concept of inherent agency).
319. See Kidd, 239 F. at 408 (recognizing how principal benefits from appointing agents).
Judge Hand thoroughly outlined how principals free their time by appointing agents:
The very purpose of delegated authority is to avoid constant recourse by third
persons to the principal .... It would certainly have been quite contrary to the
expectations of the [principal], if any of the [third parties] had insisted upon
verifying directly with [the principal] the terms of her contract. It was precisely to
delegate such negotiations to a competent substitute that they chose [the agent] at
all.
Id.
320. See id. (noting that courts must impose liability upon principal if it is to benefit from
using agents). The court stated the argument more clearly as follows:
[Clonstant recourse by third persons to the principal... would be a corollary of
denying the agent any latitude beyond his exact instructions. Once a third person
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the principal could receive the intended benefit only if it sustained liability that
arose from that benefit.
The second policy argument to retain inherent agency relates to the first.

Because inherent agency might impose liability on the principal even when
the agent has neither actual nor apparent authority, the doctrine encourages
principals to hire responsible agents. 321 Dean Sell notes the relationship
between these two policy arguments. Because a principal uses the agency
relationship to benefit itself, naturally it exercises more caution in selecting
agents less likely to overstep their authority, thereby minimizing its liability
and, ultimately, increasing its benefit from the relationship.3 22
Finally, because third parties have no control over agents, the principal
occupies a better position than third parties to prevent harm from agents'
unauthorized acts.323 When the principal places agents into positions in which
they can misrepresent their authority, the principal retains a degree of control
over the agents, whereas third parties have no such control.32 4 Recognizing
has assured himself... of the agent's mandate, the very purpose of the relation
demands the possibility of the principal's being bound through the agent's minor
deviations.
Id.
321.
See GREORY, supra note 7, § 26, at 78 ("If the employer is held to liability it is quite
likely that he will exercise care to select good agents and that he will more closely supervise
their conduct."); SEAVEY, supra note 26, § 58 (noting that inherent agency "stimulates the
watchfulness of the employer in selecting and supervising the agents"); McKay, supra note 32,
at 449 (applying argument that inherent agency makes principals select more careful agents in
tort realm as well).
322. See SEL, supra note 314, § 6 (citing policy argument that inherent agency forces
principals to take bitter with sweet and then noting, "Overall, the imposition of liability... may
actually work to the benefit of the whole class of principals, since, as a result, they inevitably
will be more careful in selecting their agents").
323. See EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 13 (comparing principal who appointed agent and
could foresee deviations from instructions with third party who contracted with agent and
concluding that "a loss that results from [such] a foreseeable deviation is better placed on the
principal").
324. See SELL, supra note 314, § 6 (finding it fair to impose liability on principals because
they were ones who placed agents in positions in which they could breach their authority); Note,
InherentPower as a Basis of a CorporateOfficer's Authority to Contract,57 COLUM. L. REV.
868, 886 (1957) (concluding that equity favors third party and that principal is in better position
to prevent harm). The concluding remarks of that note state the following:
Although the basic elements of apparent authority may be absent, the corporation
should nonetheless bear the responsibility for placing the particular officer in a
position where he could purport to represent the corporation. Even assuming that
the corporation be completely faultless..., the loss should be borne by the party
who allowed the "agent" to assume any authority in the first place, even if that
authority is flagrantly abused.
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that a principal is therefore in a better position to prevent unauthorized
conduct by agents, inherent agency holds the principal liable as long as. the
third party was reasonable. For these three reasons, inherent agency prefers
to place liability upon the principal rather than upon the third party.325
Despite these arguments based on policy, precedent, and the purpose of
Restatements, the draft of the Third Restatement attempts to replace inherent
agency with an expanded apparent authority.326 However, the expansion falls
short of the current coverage of inherent agency.32 Furthermore, regardless of
the latitude in the definition of "manifestation," apparent authority focuses on
the manifestation by the principal. Such a doctrine cannot replace inherent
agency, which focuses not on such manifestations but rather on the
interpretationof authorityby the thirdparty.
VI Conclusion
The Restatement (Second) of Agency holds forth apparent authority and
inherent agency as distinct doctrines, each of which may result in the
principal's liability for an agent's conduct.32 Whereas apparent authority only
applies if the principal makes manifestations to the third party that cause the
third party actually and reasonably to believe that the agent has authority,329
inherent agency does not require such manifestations. Instead, it considers
only the reasonableness of the third party's belief that the agent possesses
authority. 330 The draft of the Restatement (Third) of Agency eliminates
inherent agency and claims to expand the definition of "manifestation" to
substitute 331apparent authority in all situations that inherent agency currently
regulates.
This Note identifies several cases that focused on the distinction between
apparent authority and inherent agency prior to the draft of the Third
Restatement. 332 Although the draft purports to expand the definition of
325.
See Colton, supranote 7, at 443 ("[A]s between an innocent principal and an innocent
third party, inherent agency power theory requires that the loss be borne by the principal ....).
326. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing reporter's attempt to expand
definition of "manifestation" such that apparent authority includes inherent agency).
327. See supra Part VA (demonstrating inapplicability of apparent authority under draft
in cases based on inherent agency, despite expansion of "manifestation").
328. See supraParts 11.B-C (discussing apparent authority and inherent agency).
329. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (outlining requisite elements of
apparent authority).
330. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (outlining requisite elements of inherent
agency).
331.
See supra Part I (analyzing elimination of inherent agency in draft of Third Restatement and justifications therefor).
332. See supra Part IVA (discussing cases in which court correctly distinguished inherent
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"manifestation" and places the liability of undisclosed principals under the
rubric of estoppel, most of those cases would yield substantively different
results under the draft.333 Additionally, the mere fact that apparent authority
is a subset of inherent agency proves that the doctrines are distinct."" For these
reasons, elimination of inherent agency in the new Restatement conflicts with
precedent. 335 Furthermore, several policy arguments refute the justifications
that the draft of the Third Restatement provides for the change. Inherent
agency requires the principal to take the bitter with the sweet, encourages
principals to hire more responsible agents, and places liability upon the
principal that controls the agent rather than upon the third party who has no
336
such control.
Even if the draft justifies such a radical departure from precedent and
persuasively rebuts these policy arguments, the elimination of inherent agency
still is an inappropriate change for a Restatement.337 The American Law
Institute generally discourages substantive changes in Restatements and allows
only those changes that simplify the law.33 Rather than simplify the law, the
approach that the draft takes instead creates more confusion than already
exists.3 39 Whereas inherent agency focuses on the third parties' reasonable
beliefs and exists to protect third parties, apparent authority considers
manifestations by principals and seeks to promote efficiency. By substituting
one doctrine for another, the draft does not simplify the law but rather leaves
courts in a state of utter disorientation. Furthermore, even if the draft truly
expands apparent authority to the full scope of inherent agency, it could reach
the same result merely by eliminating apparent authority, a much less

agency from other agency doctrines); supra notes 269-70 (same); see also supra note 271
(identifying cases in which courts not only distinguished inherent agency from other agency
doctrines but also based their decisions on inherent agency).
333. See supra Part VA (proving that several inherent agency cases would come out
differently under draft of Third Restatement).
334. See supra Part I.D (proving that apparent authority is subset of inherent agency and
therefore necessarily distinct from inherent agency).
335. See supra Part V.A (suggesting that elimination of inherent agency in draft of Third
Restatement contradicts precedent).
336. See supra Part V.C (elaborating on these policy arguments against elimination of
inherent agency).
337. See supra Part V.B (suggesting that elimination of inherent agency is substantive
change and does not simplify law, and therefore is inappropriate in Restatement).
338. See supra notes 300-01, 304 and accompanying text (identifying original intent of
Restatement forefathers in commissioning ALl to prepare Restatements).
339. See supra notes 305-11 and accompanying text (suggesting that elimination of
inherent agency does not simplify law).
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complicated change.34 On the other hand, a failure to expand apparent
authority to the full scope of inherent agency contradicts decades
of precedent
3 41
come.
to
years
in
confusion
courts'
for
matrix
a
becomes
and

340. See supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text (noting that elimination of apparent
authority would produce same result as elimination of inherent agency followed by expansion
of apparent authority to cover all of former inherent agency, and suggesting that former would
better satisfy ALI's goal of simplifying law).
341.
See supra Part VA (noting that elimination of inherent agency contradicts precedent).

